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 This thesis seeks to explore Gregory of Nyssa’s theology of epektasis, his view of the 
body as vessel of the mind/soul and medium for interpersonal communication and the 
implications for contemporary theological discussions of disability. Epektasis is commonly 
understood as the human being’s perpetual progress towards God. This perpetual progress is 
required for the flawed human being to better him/herself in hopes of drawing closer to the 
inexhaustible goodness of God. Although the study of epektasis most often focuses on the 
individual aspect, Gregory often emphasizes the relational importance of perpetual progress. 
Gregory’s depiction of the body as the medium for communications shows the way our bodies 
exist as both perceivers and expressers. Bodies are perceivers in that they are at all times taking 
in information and communicating with others, and expressers in the way they allow the bodies 
we come into contact with to see the content of both the mind and soul. Gregory suggests that the 
human communication that takes place between bodies has positive implications for the 
perpetual progress exhibited in epektasis. Human beings are able to learn from the bodies of 
more virtuous examples, ultimately imitating the virtue these models exhibit in their lives. For 
Gregory, this bodily communication is important because the human person is not classified by 
the ability to make rational decisions or to prove ideas with intellect. The notion that the body is 
able to communicate freely without reliance on intellect creates an accessible connection to 
contemporary considerations of disability.  
 The argument of the thesis proceeds as follows. Gregory’s thought is hierarchical with a 
perfect God at the top and humans striving upwards towards that perfection through epektasis. 
Gregory’s theology of virtuous models allows individuals to resist the assumption that disabled 
persons are located below abled persons on this hierarchy. His theology pushes us to recognize 
that fragility is constituent of God’s perfection. The role of disabled persons as models of virtue 
is one way that this fragile perfection is made known. Epektasis is the human attempt to strive 
toward a perfect union with God by way of communicating with others, especially virtuous 
models, through the human body. This communication takes place through sense experiences 
highlighted by philosophers concerned with the human body such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
These conversations between Gregory and other thinkers add supplemental thought, explaining 
the ways Gregory’s theology accounts for the communicative nature on the surface and visceral 
levels of the body. The application of Gregory’s theology to contemporary thoughts on disability 
and the body is seen most clearly through an account of the author’s relationship with an 
individual with disabilities named Brooke. This application works to show the way Gregory’s 
theology of epektasis remains contemporarily relevant, and solidifies the argument of individuals 
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 Gregory of Nyssa was born in the 4th century CE to an aristocratic and wealthy family in 
or around Pontus in Neocaesarea.1 His family’s wealth afforded him the opportunity of 
significant education, a path he flourished on, along with his siblings. Although little is known 
about the specifics of his education, his writings indicate that he was well versed in classical 
literature, had a masterful understanding of rhetoric, and had a vast philosophical reach having 
read Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus, Posidonius of Apadema, and others.2 Around the time 
Gregory completed his studies, his sister Macrina embraced a “philosophical and immaterial” 
lifestyle, which she practiced at the family estate in Annisa.3 Gregory’s mother and family 
servants joined in this ascetic lifestyle, and his brother Naucratius rejected a career that promised 
to be lucrative in order to live as a hermit in the neighboring forests.4 Although influenced by his 
family’s turn to asceticism, Gregory ultimately began a career as a rhetorician.5 In 376, after a 
significant shortage of bishops, his brother Basil of Caesarea, who as Metropolitan, called 
Gregory for election into the episcopate.  
 What followed was a brilliant career wrought with controversy and significant 
contributions to the theological landscape. Although Gregory lacked the natural leadership 
abilities of his brother Basil in his role as bishop, he was, nonetheless, a sharp and incisive 
theologian, who is perhaps best recognized for his contributions to the doctrine of the Trinity. In 
the introduction to his monograph on Gregory of Nyssa, Hans Urs von Balthasar writes, “Only a 
                                                 
1 Pierre Maraval, “Biography of Gregory of Nyssa,” in The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa, eds. Lucas 
Francisco Mateo-Seco and Guilio Maspero, Trans. Seth Cherney (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2010), 105.  
2 Ibid.  
3 “The Life of Macrina” Vita s. Macrina, henceforth Macr, The English translations used for this thesis are by 
Virgina Woods Callahan (ed.) Gregorii Nysseni Opera vol.3 VIII.i (Leiden: Brill, 1952) and Kevin Coorigan, The 
Life of St. Macrina (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2005), GNO VIII.i, 381.  
4 Pierre Maraval, “Biography of Gregory of Nyssa,” 105.  
5 Gregory was also married at this time of his life, although little is known about his wife. Her name is known 
through the writings of Gregory of Nazianzus, who referred to her as Theosebia in Epig. 197: cfr. P. Devos, 1983.  
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small number of initiates have read and are aware of Gregory of Nyssa, and they have jealously 
guarded their secret.”6 However, this is no longer the case. The latter part of the 20th century 
witnessed a large surge in Gregory scholarship as contemporary scholars have explored the ways 
in which his theology relates to modern academic sensibilities.  
 One aspect of Gregory’s theology that has become a preeminent theme in modern 
scholarship of Gregory is the idea of humanity’s perpetual progress towards God, or epektasis. 
Jean Daniélou first brought this idea to attention in his 1944 monograph, From Glory to Glory.7 
In this text, Daniélou depicts epektasis as a mostly solitary journey, in which the human being 
strives to ascend into a union with God. However, within the canon of Gregory much time is 
spent considering the various ways the human body functions. Specifically, Gregory works to 
show the ways in which the body exists as a medium for interpersonal communication, thus 
connecting an individual to other human beings. Gregory’s portrayal of the relational body 
therefore adds a new dimension to his understanding of epektasis, often ignored by theologians 
such as Daniélou who emphasize the individuality of the perpetual progress. Instead, Gregory 
emphasizes that the journey towards God necessitates and is benefitted by a human being’s 
relationship to Christ, Christian communities, ecclesial life, and the sacraments of the Church. 
Thus, the body acts as the means for a human being to be in relation with others as a way of 
progressing towards a union with God.  
 This thesis will explore Gregory of Nyssa’s theology of epektasis, his view of the body as 
vessel of the mind/soul and the medium for interpersonal communication, and the implications 
for contemporary theological discussions of disability. Chapter One will focus on Gregory’s 
                                                 
6 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Presence and Thought: An Essay on the Religious Philosophy of Gregory of Nyssa, trans. 
Mark Sebanc (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1995), 15.  
7 Jean Daniélou, “Introduction,” in From Glory to Glory: Texts from Gregory of Nyssa’s Mystical Writings, 
(Yonkers, New York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1979), 3-10.  
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theological anthropology. For Gregory, the human soul and body do not exist as two separate 
entities. Instead, the soul is housed inside the body, where the body ministers to the needs of the 
soul, and the soul uses the body as its instrument.8 This understanding of the soul puts the body 
in a relational situation where it is responsible for perceiving the virtuous contents of other 
people’s souls and expressing the virtuous contents of its own soul. The theological 
understanding of embodied virtue is perhaps best illustrated within Gregory’s writings about his 
sister Macrina. Macrina exists for Gregory as a pseudo-allegorical figure who is shown literarily 
as a conversation partner in some of Gregory’s writings. In these conversations, Gregory shows 
the way in which embodied virtue makes itself known to those it comes into relationship with, 
thus benefitting an individual in their perpetual progress towards God. From here, the chapter 
turns to Gregory’s understanding of the imago Dei. Within Gregory’s theology lies a consistent 
reminder that God exists as unobtainable perfection, in a hierarchical divide above an imperfect 
humanity. However, the notion that imperfect human beings are created within the image of God 
must create some space for the possibility that fragility is constituent of God’s perfection.  
 Chapter Two looks at Gregory of Nyssa’s theological anthropology through the lens of 
modern philosophies of the body. Beginning with the French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, this chapter argues that Merleau-Ponty’s understandings of the “lived body” and the 
“chiasmus of the flesh” lend themselves to further clarification of Gregory’s theological 
anthropology. For Merleau-Ponty, flesh is portrayed as a tool for perception and touch, but is 
also seen as a unifying element that is shared by humanity. This understanding of flesh can be 
seen in Gregory’s Christology as he highlights the link between the shared flesh of humanity and 
                                                 
8“On the Soul and the Resurrection” De anima et resurrection, henceforth An et res. The translation used in this 
thesis is by Catherine P. Roth in St. Gregory of Nyssa: On the Soul and the Resurrection (Crestwood, NY: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1993), 114.  
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that of Christ, who exists as the ideal model of virtue. From there, the chapter will examine the 
philosopher Drew Leder, who offers a supplement to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of perception that 
moves beyond the surface of the body. Leder suggests that in order to truly understand the 
perceptual abilities of the body, an account must be made for the visceral body as well as the 
visible. Although internal organs are not often responsible for perceptual tasks, the surfaced 
perceptual organs are sustained by their work, and would cease to function without their 
existence. Leder calls for a deeper relationality among human beings through the visceral nature 
of their bodies. Although Gregory lived in a time period with a more narrow medical 
understanding, he often hypothesizes about the inner workings of the body. One example of this 
is a conversation that took place with his sister Macrina, about the connection between the 
location of the soul in relation to the inner organs, noting the qualities of expression and 
perception within the visceral organs.  
 These notions of the body’s ability to perceive and express are brought together through 
the thought of the philosopher Donn Welton and his theory of the “habitual body.” Welton’s 
view of the body suggests that the importance of the human person is not that they possess a 
body, mind, or soul. Instead, the significance of the body is seen in the fact that its actions are 
done habitually. Consistently, Welton’s writing reminds the reader of the limitations of human 
beings in the perceptual act. The body is at all times perceiving, yet it is always unable to 
perceive the entirety of what is around it. These reminders of finitude and fallenness are both 
vital motifs within the theology of Gregory. Thus, Gregory’s theological anthropology includes 
perceptual abilities in a way that is analogous to Donn Welton’s perceptual body.  
 Chapter Three engages two prominent voices within the academic study of disability, 
Tobin Siebers and Fiona Kumari Campbell. Through the framework of Gregory of Nyssa, this 
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chapter further argues that Gregory’s thought speaks to current discussions of disability. In 
Siebers, a correlation is seen between the theorist’s understanding of disability aesthetics and 
Gregory’s own conception of beauty and the imperfection that is fundamental to humanity. 
Siebers shows the ways in which perfection exists as an unobtainable objective when thinking 
about beauty. Similarly, Gregory understands beauty to be limited by human finitude, and 
focuses more on how the human being postures themselves in order to see beauty. In Gregory, 
the notion of perfection as a standard for beauty is present, but only applicable when the perfect 
beauty is in reference to God.  
 Fiona Kumari Campbell argues that individuals with disabilities not only have the ability 
to fulfill the role of pedagogical models, but that disabilities afford individuals a privileged status 
for teaching. This is because of the self-emptying that naturally occurs for individuals with 
disabilities. A self-emptying demeanor is necessary for epektasis, which Gregory’s suggests is 
more easily achieved when a person observes and models the behavior of a virtuous person. In 
Gregory, this achievement is again seen in his interactions with Macrina, who is portrayed as 
incredibly ill and decrepit in the time before her death, yet is still shown by Gregory to be a 
flawless model of virtue. Gregory therefore shows the ways in which a body, that is considered 
infirmed, is able to exist performatively as a model to emulate. Chapter Three concludes by 
discussing how Gregory’s understanding of fragility works to shape his considersations of virtue 
and beauty. For Gregory, virtue and beauty are not merely noetic; they extend into the human 
body. In light of the story of Brooke, space is created to argue that epektasis takes place through 
an imperfect relationship between two imperfect bodies.  
 Chapter Four shifts its attention to the story of Brooke, an individual with developmental 
disabilities, and the author’s relationship with her. Her story ultimately works to show the ways 
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in which Gregory’s understanding of the body and theology of epektasis has clear implications 
for the relationships between individuals with disabilities and nondisabled persons. 
 The thesis will conclude by connecting the main themes of Gregory of Nyssa’s theology 
with contemporary ideas of disability. Through these connections I will solidify the main 
argument of the thesis that individuals with disabilities qualify as ideal examples of the virtuous 
models within Gregory’s theology of epektasis. Approaching a theology of disability through the 
lens of Gregory also raises a secondary question regarding Gregory’s understanding of the 
hierarchical divide between God and humanity. Typical theologies of disability cast God in a 
light of accessibility, by asserting that because God allows disability or suffering among 
creation, these things must be constituent of God. However, Gregory’s hierarchy, with a perfect 
God categorically existing above a flawed earth, leaves little space for this dynamic. An account 
will therefore be made for the ways in which disability can virtuously exist inside Gregory’s 















Gregory of Nyssa’s Theological Anthropology and Theology of Epektasis 
 
Gregory of Nyssa is probably best known to those who study historical Christianity for 
his work on the development of the Trinity. Although his contributions to Trinitarian thinking 
would prove influential, they were not the only contribution Gregory made as he was also among 
the earliest theologians to develop a detailed theological anthropology. Specifically, Gregory 
argued that the body exists as an important medium through which an individual has the capacity 
to be connected to other human beings, including Jesus Christ who existed on earth with a body. 
This understanding of the body provides the framework for one of the paramount themes of his 
theology, the human person’s perpetual progress towards God, or epektasis. Gregory’s 
theological anthropology suggests that this progress towards God never exists as a solitary 
journey. The interdependence among human beings through the body exists as the vehicle 
through which human beings pursue a union with God. It is important for a person to reconnect 
through epektasis due to the separation that exists between God and humanity. This separation is 
not spatial, but is instead a matter of virtue. Human beings grow in epektasis by observing and 
learning from one another’s virtue. In a strict sense, no human being can be called virtuous, 
because no human being is able to ever truly attain the perfection that characterizes divine virtue. 
Thus, for Gregory, human beings can only ever be called virtuous in a derived and indirect 
sense.9 
 This chapter will examine Gregory of Nyssa’s understanding of the human body and its 
role as medium for the bodily communication that facilitates epektasis. The chapter will begin by 
looking at Gregory’s understanding of the role and location of the soul within the human body. 
                                                 
9 Hans Boersma, Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: An Anagogical Approach (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 4.  
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The soul’s locale and function are important to Gregory’s representation of the ways the body 
perceives the contents of other people’s souls and expresses the contents of its own soul. Within 
Gregory’s corpus, this process is seen most clearly in his writings that feature his sister Macrina, 
whom Natalie Carnes, in reference to Gregory, refers to as “the hidden heroine of our story.”10 In 
Macrina, Gregory provides a glimpse of embodied virtue existent in a human body. In this 
chapter, Gregory’s depiction of Macrina is explored as a way of seeing that all bodies are able to 
be relational, thus participating in epektasis. The embodiment present within the example of 
Macrina depicts the way that a person’s innermost spiritual qualities can be lived out and shared 
through their body, allowing the person to exist as a model of virtue. Finally, the chapter will 
depict the ways in which Gregory’s writings argue that human beings exist as the imago Dei, 
while still maintaining a hierarchical divide between God and humanity. Through this, an 
argument will be made that epektasis is able to take place through the bodily sharing of human 
virtues, despite perfection being unattainable by human beings.  
The Soul and the Human Body 
 
 The importance of the human body in the theology of Gregory of Nyssa can first be seen 
in his exposition of the dualism between body and soul. For Gregory, a human is a fusion of 
body and soul, which are first brought together in an “inexplicable and incomprehensible way.”11 
Separating himself from the theological supposition of the soul’s preexistence, Gregory instead 
insists that God created the body and soul at the same time.12 This depiction of dualism between 
                                                 
10 Natalie Carnes, Beauty: A Theological Engagement with Gregory of Nyssa, (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 
2014), 4. It is difficult to decipher the full depiction of the historical Macrina because Gregory mediates all access to 
her. Although the fact she existed in history is undisputed, Morwenna Ludlow probably comes closest to the 
consensus argument by saying that Macrina is, “at least to some degree” a “literary construction.” Morwenna 
Ludlow, Gregory of Nyssa: Ancient and (Post)modern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 214.  
11 “On the Making of Man” De hominis opificio, henceforth Op hom 15.3; The English translation of this discourse 
is by H.A. Wilson, collected in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Series II, Vol. V. Wilson, 
404.   
12 Op hom 29.1; Wilson, 420.  
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body and soul is true for Gregory only in our current life. It is different than both the pre-fallen 
state and the future state of our resurrected bodies. In both the pre-fallen and post-resurrected 
states, the human person is depicted as existing without sin, in which case Gregory regards the 
soul as governing over the body yet existing in congruence. But it is in the human’s current, 
post-fallen state, where the role of the human body becomes of paramount importance for 
Gregory’s theology. In this state, the body maneuvers according to the needs of the soul, and the 
soul uses the body as its instrument. It is because of their different natures that the body and soul 
rely on one another.13 This codependency is necessary in Gregory’s thought since for Gregory 
the soul is not confined to any one part of the body. Rather, the soul extends throughout the 
body, existing in connection with every body part.14 The various features of the human body thus 
take on special characteristics in the post-fallen state for Gregory, as they become the tool for the 
human to communicate the contents of the soul. The concept of the body often looks different for 
Gregory depending on what stage of bodily resurrection he is thinking about. For example, 
sexual organs are given to human beings as a tool for reproduction in so that “the multitude of 
human souls might not be cut short by the fall.”15 
 Gregory suggests that the “power of life and soul may be considered in three divisions,” 
the nutritive, sensitive, and intellectual.16 These separate faculties do not represent three different 
spiritual entities, or even dissimilar aspects of the same person, but rather exist within one body 
as a “psychosomatic whole.”17  Gregory roots these three faculties in scriptural prayers for a 
person’s “body, soul, and spirit” using the word ‘body’ for the nutritive part, denoting the 
                                                 
13 Op hom 12.1-4; Wilson, 397.  
14 Op hom 15. 1-2; Wilson, 403.  
15 Op hom 17.4; Wilson, 407.  
16 Op hom 8.4-5, Wilson, 393. These faculties are often referred to by different names, such as natural/vegetative, 
sensitive, and rational.   
17 John Behr, “The Rational Animal: A Rereading of Gregory of Nyssa’s De hominis opifico,” in Journal of Early 
Christian Studies 7:2 (1999), 230.  
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sensitive by the word ‘soul’, and the intellectual by ‘spirit.’18 Gregory highlights these faculties 
of the soul in light of the perceived soul of non-rational animals. The rational soul of a human 
encompasses these faculties, as well as that of non-rational animals, but is also capable of 
choosing freely based on reason.19 The ability for the various faculties of the soul to correspond 
with one another through the body is referred to by Gregory as “the perfect bodily life.”20 
 The perfect bodily life takes place through the intellectual/rational soul and can be 
described as the ruling of the rational soul over the human body, including all organs and sensory 
functions. The perfect bodily life also factors in parts of the body that separate humans from non-
rational animals. Gregory, following his forbearers in the Greek philosophical tradition, 
generally depicts the soul as interchangeable with the rational mind.21 The rational soul with its 
compliant body parts work together to depict the inner character of the mind/soul. It is important 
for Gregory’s theological anthropology that human beings have body parts that allow the human 
to exercise its rational ability. Bodily makeup and functionality are intricately designed to allow 
for the soul to exist rationally.  
 This theological presupposition that bodily functionality is designed for the soul to exist 
rationally appeals to the medical knowledge of Gregory’s day, and he considers several options. 
In On the Making of Man, in his exposition about where the mind lives, Gregory speaks of those 
who have concluded that the mind/soul live within the brain. The argument for this location 
involves the knowledge that injury to the cerebral membrane has the capacity to distort an 
individual’s ability to reason.22 Gregory also writes of skilled physicians who have concluded 
                                                 
18 Op hom 8.5, Wilson, 394. Although Gregory incorrectly attributes the scripture to the Apostle Paul’s interaction 
with the Ephesians, the reference is actually to 1 Thessalonians 5:23.  
19 Op hom 8.4, Wilson, 393.  
20 Op hom 8.4, Wilson, 393.  
21 Enrico Peroli, “Gregory of Nyssa and the Neoplatonic Doctrine of the Soul” Vigiliae Christianae 51 (1997): 117-
139.  
22 Op hom 12.1; Wilson, 397.  
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that when illness underlies different parts of the human body, the mind ceases to work 
properly.23 Alternatively, the mind/soul also finds its home in the heart; Gregory attributes this 
location to the origin of human grief.  
 Gregory’s response to assertions that the mind/soul could originate from a singular body 
part is indicative of his theological anthropology as a whole. For example, in reply to the 
understanding that grief comes from the heart, Gregory suggests that sorrow involves far more 
than discomfort in the heart. The feeling of sadness also results from an opening and closing of 
pores, the shifting of shape in the cavities within the body which causes different types of 
pressure on various organs, increased difficulty in breathing, and various other physical changes 
to the human anatomy. For Gregory, just as God is able to be present in every aspect of the 
cosmos without being confined to any particular part of it, the mind/soul has the capacity to be 
present with all bodily organs without being contained by any of them.24 
One way that Gregory depicts this relationship between body and soul is through the 
metaphor of a musician who is unable to express music without an instrument such as a flute or 
lyre.25 In this analogy, aspects of the human body take on a deeper meaning and responsibility. 
For example, Gregory writes that human body parts such as hands and vocal chords contribute to 
the human capacity for rationality because these physical body parts separate humans from “non-
rational creatures” that lack the same bodily make up.26 It is through the physical body, rather 
than the intellect, that human beings have the capacity to be rational. Gregory writes,  
Now since man is a rational animal, the instrument of his body must be made suitable for 
the use of reason…For this reason the hands were attached to the body; for though we 
can count up very many uses in daily life for which these skillfully contrived and helpful 
                                                 
23 Op hom 12.4; Wilson, 397. 
24 Xueying Wang, “Gregory of Nyssa on the Corporate Nature of the Human Body” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Notre Dame, 2014), 83.  
25 Op hom 9.2; Wilson, 395.  
26 Op hom 9.2; Wilson 395.  
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instruments, our hands, that easily follow every art and every operation, alike in war and 
peace, are serviceable, yet nature added them to our body pre-eminently for the sake of 
reason…but now, as the hand is made part of the body, the mouth is at leisure for the 
service of the reason. Thus the hands are shown to be the property of the rational nature, 
the Creator having thus devised by their means a special advantage for reason.27 
 
Gregory goes as far as to say that hands are foundational in the human ability to speak because 
they unfetter the mouth from tedious tasks such as feeding. This allows the other parts of the 
mouth (tongue, lips, etc.) to be constructed in a way that is appropriate for speaking. Likewise, 
without the soul, the body ceases to properly function. In On the Soul and the Resurrection, 
Gregory says “it is the mind which sees, and the mind which hears.”28 This reiterates that for 
Gregory, the body is a collective vessel working together to communicate the yearnings of the 
soul.  
It is also within On the Soul and the Resurrection that Gregory and his sister Macrina 
speak of the qualifications of usefulness for bodily organs. This is done by looking at the 
functions of various parts of a current human body in light of Gregory’s theology of a post-
resurrected body. Belief in the resurrection of bodies requires further questioning in regards to 
what is different or the same between the human body before and after the eventual resurrection. 
Or, as Gregory asks, “what is the resurrection to me, if instead of me someone else will return to 
life?”29 This question exists among further inquiries by Gregory, such as what becomes of parts 
such as hands, teeth, sexual organs, and feet.30 If a purpose of the human body is to ultimately be 
resurrected, what will the need be for bodily organs whose main purpose is communicative? 
                                                 
27 Op hom 8.8, Wilson, 394-395.  
28 An et res, Roth, 38. This specific quote is spoken to Gregory by his sister Macrina.   
29 An et res, Roth, 38.  
30 Robin D. Young “Gregory of Nyssa’s Use of Theology and Science in Constructing Theological Anthropology,” 
Pro Ecclesia 2 no 3 (Summer 1993), 359.   
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Ultimately Gregory decides that these organs will not be necessary to the resurrected human 
body, writing “logically none of the organs which now complete the body should exist.”31   
In a similar way as his division of the soul into three operational faculties, Gregory also 
separates human organs into groups according to their different aptitudes. One group consists of 
organs within the body that Gregory sees as necessary to human life, such as the brain, heart, and 
liver.32 Conversely are the “organs of sense,” which Gregory describes as being bestowed on 
humanity for the “gift of living well.”33 Body parts such as a nose to smell flowers or ears to hear 
music are not seen as vital, but if absent make it “impossible to joy in the pleasures of life.”34 
Gregory uses these categorizations to emphasize that life is not solely supported by any single 
part of a body. Instead, Gregory argues that it is crucial that the significance of bodily function is 
distributed among different parts of the body, writing, “The contribution of each individual is 
necessary for the whole.”35 It is through the lens of biological cohesiveness that Gregory shows 
the communicative nature of the human body.  
The Body as Perceiver/Expresser  
 The aforementioned metaphor of the body as a musical instrument becomes important 
again for understanding the corporate and relational nature of Gregory’s theological 
anthropology. The instrument of the body not only works to express the concepts that are created 
in the mind, but also exists as the medium through which the mind/soul acquires information 
from the world it is interacting with. The body thus acts as the tool through which the human 
being’s character and virtues are portrayed. Although it is the body, like the lyre, that 
                                                 
31 An et res, Roth, 112. 
32 Op hom 30.2, Wilson, 422.  
33 Op hom 30.2, Wilson, 422. 
34 Op hom 30.2, Wilson, 422. 
35 Op hom 30.2, Wilson, 422. 
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communicates meaning, the body also creates meaning through multiple opportunities of 
perception. As Gregory explains, 
The operation of the instrument, however, is twofold; one for the production of the 
sound, the other for the reception of concepts from without; and the one faculty does not 
blend with the other, but abides in the operation for which it was appointed by nature, not 
interfering with its neighbor either by the sense of hearing undertaking to speak, or by the 
speech undertaking to hear; for the latter is always uttering something, while the ear, as 
Solomon somewhere says, is not filled with continual hearing.36 
 
Gregory asserts that although the processes of perceiving and expressing are both executed by 
the human body, they remain two separate undertakings.  
Gregory begins articulating his understanding of how the mind perceives in conjunction 
with the body by referring to the “city of the mind.”37 In this metaphor, Gregory contends that a 
city receives individuals from a variety of different entrances. These visitors do not meet 
together in one isolated area, but instead spread out to innumerable destinations such as markets, 
houses, churches, theatres, etc. Similarly, the mind takes in information and experiences through 
a variety of different entry points. Gregory writes,  
…some such city of our mind I seem to discern established in us, which the different 
entrances through the senses keep filling, while the mind, distinguishing and examining 
each of the things that enters, ranks them in their proper departments.38 
 
The act of perceiving is not merely limited to the most obvious sense experience such as 
the verbal communication that takes place through speech and hearing, but also includes the 
entirety of bodily capabilities and senses such as taste, smell, touch and sight. The internal 
faculty “apprehends those things which are external to the body, and draws to itself the images of 
phenomena, marking in itself the impressions of the things which are seen.”39 Gregory affirms 
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that people both perceive things around them with a singular sense, and perceive the same object 
with different senses. To explain the body’s experience with sensory knowledge, Gregory turns 
to a useful metaphor involving the various ways a person experiences their interaction with 
honey. Human beings do not merely taste honey, they see it, hear its name, recognize its odor by 
smell, and feel its consistency by touch.40 Gregory highlights that even though it may seem like 
humanity is interacting with an object with a singular sense, it is the combination of all senses 
housed within the human vessel that perceives and engages with an object.  
The concatenation of different senses working together to perceive is also essential to the 
way the person expresses the contents of the mind/soul. The process of bodily expression causes 
Gregory to think critically about his metaphor of the body as musical instrument. Just as it is 
necessary for the instrument to be in an appropriate condition in order for the musician to create 
music, the various parts of the body used to express and perceive must also be able to perform 
the tasks required of it. This logic, when applied to Gregory’s perceived relationship between the 
body and mind/soul leads to the conclusion that a body that is disabled falls short in its capacity 
to communicate:  
But since the whole body is made like some musical instrument, just as it often happens 
in the case of those who know how to play, but are unable, because the unfitness of their 
instrument does not admit of their art, to show their skill (for that which is destroyed by 
time, or broken by a fall, or rendered useless by rust or decay, is mute and inefficient, 
even if it be breathed upon by one who may be an excellent artist in flute-playing): so too 
the mind, passing over the whole instrument, and touching each of the parts in a mode 
corresponding to its intellectual activities, according to its nature, produces its proper 
effect on those parts which are in a natural condition, but remains inoperative and 
ineffective upon those which are unable to admit the movement of art.41 
 
This assessment by Gregory is the logical conclusion to the metaphor of the body as musical 
instrument. Although Gregory confirmed the strong choreographed unison that the body 
                                                 
40 Op hom 10.6, Wilson, 396. 
41 Op hom 7.8, Wilson, 398. 
16 
 
accomplishes in the acts of perceiving and expressing, accessibility to detailed medical 
knowledge was sparse. Thus, the temptation existed to think narrowly about the abilities of 
specific organs. Gregory suggests that in the same way a broken flute ceases to make beautiful 
music, a person who has, for example, damaged eyes will cease to see. But what happens to the 
human body’s capacity to act as the medium of interpersonal communication, if part of the body 
is unable to function? Does the corporate nature of the human body that Gregory describes cease 
to be when an organ is unable to be used to express or perceive? 
 The answers to these questions rest in further exploration of Gregory’s theological 
anthropology. In Contra Eunomium II, Gregory highlights the various ways communication 
takes place between bodies. This begins with the obvious human encounter of communicating 
with speech, but shifts to various other bodily movements that are used to convey messages. 
Gregory writes, “There are occasions when by simply nodding we make it clear to others what 
needs to be done, and even the eye glancing in a particular manner indicates the purpose we have 
in mind, and a hand moving in a certain way either forbids something or allows it to be done.”42 
Gregory mentions the process of writing a note to someone when distance is such that they 
would be unable to communicate by speech. Gregory pushes the idea further by asking what, if 
anything, is lost if the contents of the mind/soul are shared without a word being spoken.43 In his 
discourse with Eunomius, Gregory attests that verbal silence causes no impediment to the 
intended action of the communicator, just as verbal discourse was not a necessity for 
communication for the Father to make known God’s will to the Son.44 Human beings, as 
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creations of God, have access to the same sort of medium where dialogue is possible despite an 
absence of speech.  
Gregory also notes that expression of the mind/soul takes place in a deeper context than 
mere replacements for speech. This means that not only does the body have the capacity to 
produce the content of the mind in different ways that are as efficient as speaking, but it also 
communicates the moral and ethical contents of the soul. This includes spiritual considerations of 
virtues and vices. Gregory thus posits an embodiment of virtues and vices that has the capacity to 
be lived out through the physical body. This theory of embodiment is specific to the singular 
individual and can be seen through Gregory as an essential aspect of a person’s identity.45 These 
individuals work to demonstrate glimpses of the divine by conducting themselves in a manner 
conducive to God’s goodness.  
Macrina and Embodied Virtue  
 An excellent example of the ability to communicate embodied virtues is found in the 
written reports of Gregory’s interactions with his sister Macrina. These texts, which often speak 
of the body through the lens of bodily performativity and spiritual asceticism, provide an 
example of a person who not only eloquently speaks her inner thoughts and convictions but also 
shares her virtues through her body’s actions. Not only do they discuss deeper meanings of 
bodily expressions in their dialogue, but Gregory also describes the theological meaning of 
Macrina’s corporeal life.  Gregory writes,  
Since you were convinced that the story of her good deeds would be of some use because 
you thought that a life of this quality should not be forgotten for the future and that she 
who had raised herself through philosophy to the highest limit of human virtue should not 
pass along this way veiled and in silence, I thought it good to obey you and tell her story, 
as briefly as I could, in a simple, unaffected narrative.46 
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46 Macr. GNO VIII. i. 379, Corrigan 26.  
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Macrina and Gregory were born to a wealthy family, and Macrina was married at a young age to 
a rhetor who died early on in their marriage. Upon her husband’s death, Macrina refused to be 
married again, and instead committed herself to a celibate lifestyle devoted to theological 
contemplation. This commitment to asceticism not only took place in her inner thoughts, but 
permeated into her actions and communications with others. Macrina began actively expressing 
countercultural gestures such as freeing the family’s slaves and turning their expansive property 
into a religious community.47 She also gave wise counseling and a calming physical presence to 
her family and spiritual community. This included being a strong source of support and comfort 
to her mother following the death of her brother Naucratius and for Gregory in the face of their 
brother Basil’s death.48 Gregory spoke of Macrina’s work after Naucratius’ death by saying “the 
excellence of the great Macrina became clear. Placing reason in opposition to passion, she kept 
herself from falling and, by becoming a support to her mother’s weakness, she drew her back 
again from the depths of grief.”49  
 Looking at Macrina’s life in light of considerations of the bodily capacities to express and 
perceive virtues also highlights the way bodily observations become intellectual thoughts. For 
Gregory, there remains a difference between the information a person perceives and what 
benefits the person on an intellectual level. Returning to the metaphor of the musical instrument, 
Gregory argues that Macrina’s life works as an instrument because of the design of her creator. 
Macrina tells Gregory, “Do you see what your sight teaches you? It would not provide you with 
such understanding by its own power, if there were not something looking through the sense of 
sight which can use the things which come to perception as guides to penetrate through the 
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appearances to that which does not appear.”50 Skills such as vision do not exist as singular 
abilities contained within an isolated organ, but instead rely on the entirety of the body in its 
interconnected system, allowing for deeper considerations of the objects the body experiences. 
The materiality of human beings is therefore seen as essential to the tasks of perceiving and 
expressing, and it is through this process where the human person has the capacity to use and 
strengthen the intellectual capabilities of the mind. It is therefore through the human being’s 
capacity to perceive the happenings of the world around them and express the inner contents of 
their own mind that allows the person to strengthen their own soul. In this regard the soul’s 
activity is imaginative, providing intellectual space and energy to combine its perceptions with 
knowledge.51 “Intellectual” in this context does not necessarily mean intelligent. Rather, it 
represents the ability to generate meaning from what is perceived, and strive to express this 
meaning through bodily communication.  
 Gregory’s theological anthropology creates space for knowledge that resists the urge to 
be rooted in the typical acquisition of mental knowledge. Instead, the framework of this type of 
knowledge is relational and is concerned with the ways in which the soul matures and influences 
in its bodily interactions with others. In this light, the human ability to embody virtue is seen 
through a lens of inclusivity. Knowledge and intelligence is not something that can be qualified 
or ranked in comparison with others. Instead, it exists in the ability to perceive and express the 
contents of the soul, an ability that is present in everyone.  
Epektasis and the Relational Body 
Among the more prominent aspects of Gregory's theological discourse is his theory 
of epektasis. Epektasis is most simply defined as the process of flawed human beings continually 
                                                 
50 An et res, Roth, 40.  
51 Medi Ann Volpe, Rethinking Christian Identity, 170.  
20 
 
striving towards the perfection that is the divine. This is stressed by Gregory to be the highest 
calling of human beings. It is in epektasis where the convergence of much of Gregory’s theology 
happens, including the consideration of divine infinity and ineffability, which works to 
simultaneously portray God as both transcendent and completely present to the human person.52 
Epektasis also works to communicate the understanding that relational emotions such as love and 
desire are not limited in their capacity to develop.53 Jean Daniélou referred to epektasis as “the 
synthesis of Gregorian spirituality” saying that “it belongs to the very essence of the spiritual life 
to be a continual progress, so that, however paradoxical it might seem, perfection exists in a 
continual progress.”54 By qualifying the human person as continuously attempting to progress 
towards perfection, Gregory gently depicts the person as less than perfect. It is also through 
epektasis where Gregory departs from the popular Greek thought of his time, which considered 
human perfection as an eventual accomplishment, similar to reaching a goal.55 For Gregory, all 
human beings are imperfect striving to move closer to the all-encompassing perfection that is 
God.  
Proper understanding of Gregory’s theory of epektasis requires engagement with three 
sources from the 20th century that have each worked to further clarify Gregory’s thought: Jean 
Daniélou’s Platonisme et théologie mystique, Ekkehard Mühlenberg’s Die Unendlichkeit Gottes 
bei Gregor von Nyssa, and Ronald Heine’s 1975 monograph, Perfection in the Virtuous Life: A 
Study in the Relation between Edification and Polemical Theology in Gregory of Nyssa’s De Vita 
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Moysis.56 Jean Daniélou’s 1944 dissertation Platonisme et théologie mystique locates the theme 
of eternal progress within the framework of Gregory’s spiritual doctrine and his vision of the 
three stage ascent of the soul.57 Paul Blowers summarizes Daniélou’s work on epektasis as 
representing “the process of perfection in general, but is an expression par excellence of 
Gregory’s third stage of spiritual development, the “darkness” wherein the soul’s indefatigable 
yearning for God stands in perpetual tension with God’s inexhaustible beauty and mystery.”58  
In his work Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa, Ekkehard Mühlenberg 
argued against Daniélou’s interpretation by saying that he is inserting a medieval western idea of 
mystical relationship between God and human into Gregory’s thought.59 According to Blowers, 
Mühlenberg instead approaches epektasis, specifically as it is seen in the Contra Eunomium, 
through the lens of Gregory’s philosophical theology.60 For Mühlenberg, human beings’ 
progression of epektasis in light of God’s divine infinity should not be interpreted as an 
impediment of human knowledge, but rather, as Blowers writes, “an open field of action, of 
eternal movement and self-realization.”61 Mühlenberg reminds readers of Gregory’s thought that 
the limited nature of human beings is not something that will be overcome, but rather exists as an 
important reminder of God’s perfection. A limited nature and inability to reach perfection is 
simply part of what it means to be a human person.  
In Ronald Heine’s 1975 monograph, Perfection in the Virtuous Life: A Study in the 
Relation between Edification and Polemical Theology in Gregory of Nyssa’s De Vita Moysis, 
Heine portrays epektasis as Gregory’s attempt to overcome the dominant influence of Origen. 
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Heine highlights the Origenist understanding that the product of fallen souls is based on an 
overindulgence, or satiety (χόρος) of God’s goodness.62 For Origen, humanity has a fall of souls 
due, in part, to the limitedness of human beings clashing with the continual perfection of God. 
Humanity lacks a similar perfection, and is unable to adequately interact with God’s perfection, 
allowing a satiation to take place. Gregory’s development of epektasis, particularly in texts such 
as The Life of Moses, therefore exists as a polemic against Origenism.63 For Heine, epektasis is 
Gregory’s attempt to understand human beings’ limitedness in light of the relationship between 
body and soul.  
These three works on epektasis all agree that it is important for Gregory’s thought that 
the human life never be stagnant. Transition, change, and progress are both unavoidable and 
good for humankind. It is this mutability that becomes the primary difference between creation 
and the divine. Human beings are mutable, and God is immutable.64 Gregory argues that the soul 
can never tire of the divine beauty, for each time a person experiences it, a new desire is born.65 
Although the progress exhibited in epektasis is not physical, Gregory often describes the process 
with vivid language such as climbing a mountain or taking part in a race.66  The soul, after taking 
part in the experience described in these metaphors, is able to “grow without limit in the capacity 
for good”.67 Or, as described by Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco, “the point of arrival (πέρας) is 
transformed into the beginning (ἀρχή), closer to that which is further ahead.”68 Epektasis is not 
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to be seen as a process of continual longing in which the human person never attains the 
goodness that is present within God. Instead, it is a continuous enrichment in divine perfection 
that inspires the soul to strive again towards God’s unremitting love.  
The perfection that is present in the process of epektasis is most often classified as virtue. 
This perfection in virtue exists beyond words, because the perfect life is beyond definition.69 
Because the divine goodness is unlimited, consequently, the desire of the person who searches to 
participate in divine goodness also has no limits.70 Virtue, like perfection, is not limited by 
anything outside of itself, but only limited by the unlimited.71 Gregory’s theological 
understanding of virtue is nearly identical to his understanding of perfection. That is, for 
Gregory, it is not the case that a human being cannot reach virtue through spiritual progress, but 
rather that a person always has the capacity to grow in virtue. Gregory writes, “The perfection of 
human nature consists in being always disposed to reach a greater good.”72 Epektasis does not 
exist for Gregory as a theological strategy to show the ways in which the human person has the 
capacity to reach a nearly similar level of goodness that God exhibits. Instead, epektasis exists to 
show the perpetuity and transcendence of the Divine. Or as Mateo-Seco suggests, “It is not that 
God is ‘unreachable,’ but that, even if possessed, He always surpasses the one who possesses 
him already.”73 
Epektasis, however, is not to be solely understood as relationship summarized as the 
connection between the human person and God. Instead, Gregory also speaks of epektasis in a 
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communal manner, encompassing all interactions that human beings have with one another. This 
is not to say that the perpetual progress human beings make towards the goodness of God is not, 
in part, an isolated effort left up to the individual decisions of the human person. Instead, since 
the human experience takes place in community with one another, the process of epektasis must 
also factor in human relationality.  
The interpretation of epektasis as an individual pursuit is the easiest to identify and is the 
perspective in which most work on the subject has been done. It involves an understanding of the 
individual person having the capacity to undergo a positive form of change. This understanding 
involves a rejection of the popular thought of Plato and Origen in Gregory’s day, is referred to by 
Paul Blowers as “a watershed in Greek patristic anthropology.”74 By focusing on the individual 
pursuit within epektasis, Gregory truly separates his thought from his antecedents due to his 
understanding of the personal change a human goes through in epektasis as a positive 
experience. This unique perspective is clearly portrayed in Gregory’s twelfth homily In 
Canticum Canticorum, where Gregory depicts the individual’s free will as caught between the 
upward change of the Holy Spirit and the downward movement of the human body.75 It is in this 
isolated pursuit that an individual is able to find their true ontological and eschatological 
stability.76 
The emphasis of the individual pursuit within epektasis can also be seen in the biblical 
texts Gregory uses to illustrate the process, particularly in his Life of Moses and Commentary on 
the Song of Songs, two texts commonly referenced in the study of perpetual progress. The 
mystical nature of the Life of Moses is impossible to ignore. The work features detailed prose 
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about Moses’ encounter with divine darkness and depicts his journey as an isolated, personal, 
journey that culminates in an engagement with God. Similarly, in the Commentary on the Song 
of Songs Gregory chooses to focus on the bride in the story as an individual person as well as an 
allegorical representation of the church. This individual experience is seen depicted in Homily 1, 
where Gregory writes, “what is described there is an account of a wedding, but what is 
intellectually discerned is the human soul’s mingling with the divine.”77 Gregory views the 
marriage depicted in the scriptural passage as taking place between the individual soul and the 
divine.  
However, there also exist obvious examples within these scriptures in which epektasis 
takes place not just between God and individual, but rather among community. In thinking about 
the capacity of perpetual progress to exist within a corporate body Xueying Wang writes, 
“admitting that epektasis is often described as the ascent of an individual, we must not lose sight 
of the fact that in Gregory’s vocabulary, an individual ascent is not an individualistic ascent.”78 
In her dissertation, she goes on to highlight the communal aspects within the stories of Moses 
and the bride. For example, although Moses climbs Mount Sinai alone in an isolated pursuit for a 
mystical union with God, he eventually comes down to the Israelites with two tablets from God 
so that they could also ascend to God.79 Moses, despite journeying up the mountain and into the 
life of God by himself, is at all times connected to the life and vitality of the people of Israel. 
Similarly, in the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Wang highlights that the union of love 
between the bride and Christ is never presented as self-contained or exclusive.80 This is 
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supported by Gregory’s insistence that the bride expresses “an ecclesiastical concern” throughout 
her ascent.81 Gregory suggests that at each stage of the bride’s spiritual ascent she shares her 
experiences with her companions and encourages them to make progress in their own individual 
spiritual journey. Thus even when epektasis is portrayed as an individual spiritual journey, it is 
not separated from the rest of the body of Christ.82 
Epektasis is portrayed as bettering oneself as a way of gaining progress towards the 
goodness of God. In the Commentary on the Song of Songs, Gregory shows two different paths 
humanity can follow as a way of growing closer to God, the word of faith and the manner of 
life.83 The word of faith is not merely belief in God, but also accounts for the disposition and 
character qualities of the individual. For Gregory, a strong word of faith is necessary, partly as a 
way of avoiding the erroneous depictions of God that heretics describe. Thus, before individuals 
can begin on their journey of epektasis, they must first set their mind to the proper disposition of 
belief so that they not get dissuaded from their progress. Conversely, the manner of life is less 
about a mental mindset and is concerned more with the soul’s control of the body to physically 
live out a virtuous life. The character of the connection between the incorporeal responsibilities 
of the human soul and the corporeal actions of the body is vital to Gregory’s theological 
anthropology.  
Examples of Virtue 
 Gregory portrays epektasis as a process that involves the individual and the community, 
as well as the corporeal and incorporeal features of the body. In light of his aforementioned 
interpretation of the body as the medium for interpersonal communication, Gregory argues for a 
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portion of epektasis to take place within human relationships.84 For Gregory, not everyone has 
access to divine language directly from God. Because of this reality, spending time with those 
who are understood to be virtuous is of paramount importance for an individual’s own journey of 
epektasis. These individuals exist in the theology of Gregory as virtuous models for others to 
learn from by observing and imitating their bodily presence. Because the body acts as the 
medium for communication between individuals, it also acts as the vehicle for individuals to 
learn lessons of virtue from one another.  
In describing the significance of the ecclesial body, Gregory resorts to metaphors of the 
human body culminating with Christ at the head.85 Citing Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians, 
Gregory writes,  
Those members that are grafted into him (Christ) through faith he fits into the common 
body, and he fashions a comely whole by fitly and appropriately assigning believers to 
roles such as eyes and mouth and hands and the other members…Yet all the members do 
not have the same function. Instead, there is one member that is an eye in the body, 
though it does not look down on the hand, and another, though it is the head it does not 
spurn the feet; but through its members the whole body is bound together with itself by 
their various functions, lest the parts be at odds with the whole.86 
 
Gregory thus depicts human persons as having specific talents that are unique to themselves and 
different from those around them. Although humans are made up of different spiritual 
inclinations and character qualities, they nonetheless have access to the things they lack through 
the observation of virtuous models. This requires the person to interact with the community 
around them in order to glean a more robust depiction of the virtuous life. 
A common motif within the theology of Gregory of Nyssa is that direct knowledge of 
God is inaccessible to the limited mind of human beings. However, according to Gregory it is 
                                                 
84 Wang, “Gregory of Nyssa on the Corporate Nature of the Human Body,” 178-179.  
85 Cant GNO VI. 390; Norris, 413. 
86 Cant GNO VI. 390; Norris, 413.  
28 
 
through the aforementioned relationality that human beings are able to know anything about 
God. Gregory speaks of this knowledge allegorically, comparing human knowledge of God to an 
interaction with gold. All ingenuous statements about God are not the pure gold itself, but are 
considered to be likenesses of gold.87 Communication from God is rare and mystical for Gregory 
and happens only to a very small portion of the people in the world. The majority of people are 
left to learn from the virtuous people around them who have discovered important lessons during 
their own epektasis. As Gregory reminds his readers, Moses is the only Israelite who makes the 
journey up Mount Sinai. The rest of the community is left to wait and learn from the model of 
virtue.  
Human relationality also allows for glimpses of the divine life in corporeal ways. This 
move away from intellectuality into the physical allows for what Rowan Williams refers to as 
“permeating the whole of life.”88 The body, as instrument of communication for the contents of 
the mind/soul has the capacity to speak its spiritual wisdom to others. While experiencing their 
own epektasis, human beings also exist as models of virtuous living from whom others may 
glean wisdom. This means a person’s interactions with others are not merely a chance to verbally 
exchange information, but rather an opportunity to be a witness of the virtuousness that they 
exhibit in their own life.   
The conveying of virtues is most obviously done through the demonstration of love, 
which Gregory considers to be the highest virtue. Because human beings’ communication with 
one another must overcome different planes of intellectual capabilities, the physical signification 
of love becomes the most efficient vehicle of interpersonal communication. This is seen through 
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physical signifiers such as touch, which communicates virtues without the use of typical sensory 
organs. Rowan Williams describes this by writing,  
In his commentary on the Beatitudes (Gregory) says simply that, since “intellectual” 
knowledge of God is impossible, he must be found and known in the converted heart of 
the believer and in the purity of his or her life and actions…Thus the focus of attention is 
subtly shifted from the experiences of the interior life to the whole history of human 
growth; more than most previous Christian writers, Gregory exploits the classical term 
arête, “moral virtue,” in his writing, regarding the attainment of this quality as the end of 
all “spiritual” experience.89 
 
Thus the corporeal body takes on a deeper, more spiritual responsibility as the vessel of the 
mind/soul and vehicle of communication. It is not only to be considered as a part of the mouth or 
speech organs that talk or the ears that listen, nor are its capabilities limited to the 
communication that can take place with a meaningful glance or facial expression. Included in all 
of this, the body also has the capacity to mystically communicate spiritual understandings, as 
wisdom, morality, and virtues are visible by watching a person’s body. This communication 
creates a physical example of epektasis from which the observing person can learn from and 
model themselves after.  
Models of embodied virtue also exist in places outside the human body. The first place 
virtue is embodied for Gregory is within scripture. Hans Boersma states, “That for Gregory the 
virtuous life is the aim of all biblical interpretation.”90 One example of this is Gregory’s 
interpretation of Ecclesiastes, which Gregory says begins by addressing the futility of temporal 
enjoyments before moving on to discuss the attainment of virtue.91 In discussing his 
summarizing of the book, Gregory writes that Ecclesiastes is about “how one may live virtuously 
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(κατἀρετὴν) by obtaining from the text some art and method, so to speak, of successful living.”92 
This hermeneutic allows for the human body to learn from virtue that exists outside of human 
interpersonal communication.  
Above scripture and relationality, Gregory emphasizes that the earthly life of Christ 
exists as the preeminent model of virtuous living. This is not to belittle the importance, for 
Gregory, of modeling the morality of other human beings, but exists as a reminder that even the 
most virtuous of human beings do not exist near the same extent of perfection of Christ.93 In 
calling the human person to mirror the virtuous example of Christ, Gregory is clear that he is 
referring to the human nature of Christ and not the divine. This means that, for Gregory, the 
human virtues and divine virtues are separate. Thus, although Gregory’s theology avers that 
knowledge of the divine is unattainable, Christ as a perfect human being exists as a bodily model 
for human beings to imitate.94 Imitation of the bodily life of Christ therefore becomes quite 
similar to mirroring certain examples of human saints.95 This imitation, together with the 
aforementioned virtues in scripture, works to create a cohesive network of virtue that the human 
being has access to learn from. This takes place not only through a scriptural and spiritual lens, 
but reaches out to the corporeal and observable. 
Imago Dei and Human/Divine Hierarchy   
  Christ’s capacity to exist as a model of virtue extends to the human being, who lives in 
the world as the imago Dei. Christ, in His time on earth, exists as the perfect example of virtuous 
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living for human beings to imitate. Human beings, because they have been created in the image 
of God, therefore have the ability to exist as representations of virtuous living for other human 
beings that observe them. Although the human being lacks the intellectual capabilities of 
understanding specific character qualities of God, to say that creation exists in the image of God 
must denote some shared attributes with the divine.  
Gregory suggests that human beings are like God, not merely because God has created 
humanity to rule over the rest of creation in a way that is similar to God ruling over creation.96 
Instead, human beings rule over creation by virtue of sharing in the image of God and sharing in 
specific divine qualities.97 In his introduction to a collection of Gregory’s mystical writings, Jean 
Daniélou gives the example of freedom as an attribute shared between God and humanity. 
Daniélou emphasizes human’s capacity for free will as evidence.98 In the theology of Gregory, 
Daniélou sees an emphasis on the human’s ability to exercise free will over other mental 
characteristics such as intelligence.99 Free will exists as something that every human being has 
access to, regardless of intellectual aptitude or mental capabilities.  
Free will, as an attribute shared with God, calls into question what human beings have the 
ability to exercise free will over. After all, the omnipotent God exists without limits in regards to 
governing influence. However, although human beings exist as the image of God, and therefore 
share aspects of divine attributes, they are still comparatively limited in relation to God. For 
Gregory, God designed the human being’s bodily form in a specific way so that it could be 
governed by the person’s free will.100 This understanding of the human being’s use of free will 
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mirrors the aforementioned explanation of Gregory’s understanding of body/soul dualism. 
Although the soul participates directly with shared divine character qualities, the body facilitates 
and acts out this participation. The ability for the human mind/soul to rule over different aspects 
of the body through its free will shows the similarities to divine attributes of God who governs 
over creation. 
These shared divine attributes therefore act as a unifier among humanity. That is, all 
humans, in both material and immaterial forms, are united to one another.101 The unity of 
humanity, as image of God, extends past corporeality and temporality, and always exists from 
the eternal perspective of God.102 Gregory metaphorically depicts this unity by comparing 
humanity to the lost sheep that wandered, suggesting that the act of bringing the lost sheep 
together is indicative of Christ’s unifying work. Although human beings have the ability to 
portray the image of God in varying degrees, the aptitude, nonetheless, brings a certain harmony 
to humanity.103 This is neatly summarized by Rowan Greer, who writes that the two major 
lessons that can be pulled from Gregory and the Cappadocians are a “a corporate understanding 
of human nature” and that “humanity, as the image of God, must mirror God and by doing so 
find the power to govern the body and to harmonize and divinize the entire created order; 
contemplation leads to incorruption not only for the individual but also for the whole of 
creation.”104 However, this sentiment begs the question of which characteristics of the imago Dei 
are human beings best suited to reflect.  
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Gregory’s understanding of human beings as the image of God is often portrayed through 
two lenses, beauty and power.105 Gregory’s depiction of beauty in light of the image of God is 
often seen in his writings on virginity. This is because earthly passions have the potential to 
weaken the beauty of the soul, thus corrupting the soul’s reflection of the divine image.106 The 
virtuous soul will reflect God’s beauty, just as a mirror pointed at the sun would reflect 
sunlight.107 However, because of humanity’s disposition to sin, humanity is often found turning 
its back towards the light of God. The human senses beginning in adolescence lead individuals to 
seek out earthly pleasure before a sense of maturity is present in their souls.108 This creates the 
initial instinct of seeking the pleasing rather than the Beautiful.109 For Gregory, the process of 
returning back to the reflection of divine beauty is a matter of perception. In order for a person to 
position themselves toward what is beautiful, they must first learn to perceive it.110 This 
perception, which is executed by the body, does not happen immediately, but rather requires a 
certain degree of conditioning in order to happen. The more one seeks the truly beautiful, the 
better they are able to perceive it.111 The better a person is at perceiving the beautiful, the more 
desirable it ultimately becomes. Gregory writes,  
The man who has purified the eye of his soul is able to look at such things and forget the 
matter in which the beauty is encased, and he uses what he sees as a kind of basis for his 
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contemplation of intelligible beauty. By a participation in this beauty, the other beautiful 
things come into being and are identified.112 
 
Beauty in light of the imago Dei is not merely a visual experience, but a matter of full 
perception. This perception enlists the human body to not only act as the medium for 
communication, but also as perceiver for the soul. The ability to perceive divine beauty involves 
the person embodying virtues that are shared with the divine, and participating in divine beauty.  
This again reinforces the idea that the image of God is found in the whole person and not merely 
the intellect.  
The metaphor of human participation as a mirror of divine beauty also means that a 
person living a less-virtuous life can obscure the image of God so that the divine beauty is unable 
to be seen. This can be seen in Gregory’s metaphor of the body as the instrument for the image 
of God. That is, an un-virtuous life is like an instrument that is not being “played,” or the activity 
of reflection is not happening.113 This does not mean that the beauty of God is now void in the 
un-virtuous person.114 Rather, it is necessary for a person to be actively participating in virtue 
with their body. This participation happens through the body’s ability to perceive and express the 
contents of the soul. Thus, a person that ceases to express virtue is not fully realizing their bodily 
ability to act as a medium for communication. This does not exist as a bodily deficiency, but a 
spiritual one. Gregory posits that the answer to a sinful life that does not reflect divine beauty is 
spiritually participating in things such as imitation, learning Scripture, and taking part in the 
practices and life of the community.115 These spiritual practices all exist without the necessity of 
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intellect. Rather, the ability to more fully realize the image of God present in oneself is to further 
surround oneself with a virtuous community.  
Gregory’s second lens in which to view the imago Dei in humanity is to think of human 
beings as the image of the power of God. This power is exercised in the aforementioned human 
capacity of free will and makes humanity “like the One who has power over all things, being 
enslaved by necessity to none of the things outside of himself, and he acts according to what 
seems best to him.”116 Gregory is also seen portraying the power of God within humanity 
through the bodily ability of senses or in other experiences of perception.117 Although shared, the 
power in humanity is not the same as the power of God.118  
Hans Urs von Balthasar concisely summarizes the idea of divine power shared with 
humanity through immanence by pulling brief passages from a variety of Gregory works and 
adding his own commentary:  
God has given and always gives to beings the power of coming to be and also 
perseverance in being”, and without this divine power, matter would remain eternally 
inert. The best image of this immanence is that of the soul in the body. For just as the 
soul shows her superiority over matter precisely by her power to touch it, not merely on 
the surface, but in all its depths and at each point of its substance, so God shows his 
absolute transcendence precisely by means of a very intimate contract with things and a 
deep-seated immanence: “We do not hesitate to say that the divine Nature and Power are 
immanent in all things.” Even though there is no fusion of substances, there is a union so 
intimate that Gregory calls it a mingling. If one can already say that the divine will is “the 
matter and substance of created works” or better still, that it is “the matter and form and 
energy of the world”, this will apply in a very particular way to the rational creature.119 
 
In this instance “rational creature” alludes to an individual who has positioned themselves 
“toward God” in attempt of mirroring divine virtue, which circumvents the requirement of 
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intellectual capabilities. This connection to the non-essential nature of the intellect will become 
important for the later application of Gregory’s theological anthropology to considerations of 
individuals with disabilities. Gregory argues that since standard spiritual rhetoric often argues 
that God’s power is immanent in all things, why should all human bodies be any different?  
However, Gregory would certainly argue that although various aspects of divine nature 
are shared with humanity, this does not necessarily mean they are identical. Always present in 
the theology of Gregory is the understanding that God exists in a perfection that is inaccessible to 
human beings. This means that any shared attributes or knowledge of God that humanity 
experiences are mere fractions of what is true about God. In a sense, no human being can be 
called virtuous, because no one can ever truly attain the perfection that characterizes the divine 
virtue of God.120 Thus, human beings can only ever be virtuous in an indirect way in light of 
God’s virtues. This becomes the impetus for Gregory’s theology of epektasis. No matter how far 
the human being progresses in virtue, they will never come near the perfection of God. Gregory 
is blatant about the disparity between the perfection of God and the limitedness of human beings. 
He writes, “It is beyond my power to encompass perfection in my treatise or to show in my life 
the insights of the treatise.”121 Gregory goes on to say that this inability is the same for even 
great and virtuous individuals, writing that it is “impossible for those who pursue the life of 
virtue to attain perfection.”122 Although Gregory is adamant about the hierarchical divide of 
perfection between God and humanity, his theology of epektasis, specifically as it relates to 
bodily participation, has to allow for some fragility within the relationship between humanity and 
the divine.  
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Fragility and the Divine 
In thinking about the person existing as the imago Dei, certain questions arise regarding 
the limitations of the human body in light of Gregory’s notion of divine perfection. What does it 
mean that a human shares and communicates divine character qualities with their body, but also 
has the capacity to exist physically in an un-virtuous state? How do bodies that are aged, or 
physically disabled, depict their stake in divine perfection? It is in thinking about the limitations 
where an understanding of the flawed human body points to a fragility that exists in God. 
Fragile, in this sense, does not mean frail or breakable. Rather, God’s fragility exists inside 
divine perfection as a way of explaining the existence of perceived limitations in humanity. 
Gregory’s theology pushes his readers to recognize that this sort of fragility is constituent of 
God’s perfection. Fragility inside of God’s perfection is not to be viewed as a flaw or a defect, 
but rather creates an avenue for a perfect God to share in a human experience that can often 
result in varying levels of physical or mental brokenness.123 
The fragility in this dynamic shows that the divide between God and humanity is not 
static. Rather, this relationship is participatory where human beings strive and God allows 
fractions of Godself to be experienced. This fragility is seen in Macrina’s understanding of the 
image of God, which she argues is not a possession of the individual, but an activity in which the 
soul, contained in the body, turns toward the divine and comes to participate in the divine life.124 
Although separated hierarchically in light of God’s unattainable perfection, humanity and God 
are not entirely separate due to the human need for participation in the divine. For Gregory, the 
whole nature of humanity, including both body and soul, is made so as to take part in the divine 
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image, constructed so as to be filled with the image-bearing soul.125 The creation of the body 
would not need to factor in the potential for this type of work if the hierarchical separation of 
God and humanity was so great that human beings were unable to participate in aspects of the 
divine life. For Gregory, if the divide were this concrete, and relation with God was so 
intangible, God would not have created human beings with the capability of experiencing the 
divine life.  
This fragility does not mean that God is in any way limited or outside of the pure 
perfection that Gregory portrays. Rather, it allows for glimpses of the divine life to be seen, so 
that human beings may strive toward divine perfection through the process of epektasis. This 
hierarchical line must also remain fragile in order to allow equal access for participation in the 
divine life for all of humanity. In the theology of Gregory, the most basic necessity for 
progressing toward the divine life is not the ability to reason, or the ability to consciously seek 
God. Instead, it is love. Anthony Meredith explains Gregory’s theology by writing, “to fail to 
display love is as fatal to our claim to be the image of God as to be devoid of reason.”126 The 
divine life is nothing more or less than the operation of divine love.127 Although this divine love 
exists in God, who is the quintessential example of perfection, it does not exist as separate from 
humanity, or limited to anyone based on ability. As Macrina explains in On the Soul and 
Resurrection, “For the life of the superior nature is love, since the beautiful is in every respect 
loveable to those who recognize it, and the divine knows itself.”128  
Conclusion 
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 Gregory’s view of the body begins in his understanding of body/soul dualism. That is, in 
the current post-fallen, pre-resurrected state, the body and soul rely on one another. The body 
maneuvers and acts according to the direction of the soul, and the soul exists throughout the 
body, allowing the body to physically act out the contents of the soul. The soul consists of three 
faculties, the nutritive, sensitive, and the intellectual, that the body works to portray along with 
the soul and the spirit.129 The correspondence of the various faculties of the soul lived out 
through the body is what gives human beings their rationality, and is referred to by Gregory as 
“the perfect bodily life.”130 The soul and body thus rely on one another in a way that resembles a 
musician and their instrument.  
The body therefore works as the vessel of the soul and the tool used to express the souls 
contents. However, its responsibility does not end there. The body also takes on the task of 
perceiving all of the exchanges the person comes into contact with. The tasks of expressing and 
perceiving are not limited to the most obvious sense locations, such as the mouth for speaking or 
the ears for listening. Rather, Gregory suggests that when the body is perceiving an object it does 
so with the entirety of available parts and senses. Similarly, when the body expresses something 
it does so through a variety of bodily functions outside of speech such as touch, glances, body 
language, etc. For Gregory, the body serves to perceive and express the contents of the soul 
through a variety of different corporeal sources. This also means the body has the capacity to 
perceive and express despite deficiencies. If, for example, a person does not have the ability to 
properly speak or form words, Gregory’s theology would suggest that the ability to convey 
messages still exists. This does not merely mean that a person with this type of disability is able 
to express that they have a physical need by communicating through glances or hand 
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movements. It also means that such a person has the ability to express the contents of their 
embodied virtues.  
The most obvious example of embodied virtues in Gregory’s canon is his writing on his 
sister Macrina. Not only did Macrina become a significant spiritual leader to her religious 
community despite obvious gender inequalities of her day, but her ministry also coincided with 
significant challenges to her health.131 Macrina’s understanding of her body’s experience with 
illness serves as an example of the ways embodied virtues can ultimately become strands of 
intellectuality. Without the body, human beings would cease to have the tools to learn or engage 
with the rest of creation. A person’s access to intellectual knowledge is less about the amount of 
information they can retain, and more about the ways they are able to embody the lessons 
learned from perceiving. The embodiment of virtues through perceiving and expressing others 
who are virtuous is therefore accessible to all people despite intellectual prowess. This is 
important due to the essentiality of this task for the process of epektasis.  
Present in the theological understanding of epektasis is Gregory’s emphasis that the 
human life never remains spiritually stationary. Because a person is always in a constant state of 
transition, Gregory accentuates the importance of directing this progression towards the virtue 
present in the divine life. The divine perfection that human beings strive for in epektasis, like 
God, has no end. Virtue, like perfection, always exists for the human being to strive towards. 
God’s perfection is unobtainable because God has the ability to continuously surpass the virtuous 
person striving through epektasis. Because of Gregory’s depiction of God as existing beyond all 
human comprehension, epektasis cannot exist as an isolated effort between human and the 
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divine. Instead, epektasis must also occur in the relational communication that takes place 
between humans. Epektasis is therefore enriched by the observance and imitation of virtuous 
models.  
Because direct knowledge of God is inaccessible to human beings, knowledge garnered 
through the observance of virtuous models becomes of paramount importance. These models 
exist both as virtuous people on earth, as well as Christ, who lived a virtuous life after becoming 
human. The growth vis-a-vis epketasis that takes place through the observance of others is not 
possible without the body. The conveyance of virtue among human beings is most obviously 
done through the demonstration of love, which Gregory considers to be the highest virtue. Love 
is also important as a communication device because it transcends different levels of intellectual 
capabilities. All people are able to demonstrate love through the vessel for communication that is 
their body.  
The ability for both human beings and Christ to exist as virtuous models highlights the 
similarities and differences between the divine and human beings who exist as imago Dei. It is 
possible for human beings to exist in this way because they share muted versions of the same 
character qualities as God. These character qualities, such as free will, allow for the human 
person to govern over portions of creation like animals and vegetation in a similar way that God 
governs over humanity. The human person also has the ability to reflect divine beauty, through 
their life as a virtuous person. This beauty is seen by others who are observing the bodies of 
virtuous models, therefore benefitting their epektasis. It is the shared character qualities between 
God and humanity that are able to be expressed and perceived by the human body.  
It is in the shared character qualities of God and humanity as imago Dei where an account 
of God’s fragility must also be established. Although God exists as unobtainable perfection in a 
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way that human beings could never fathom, the reality of these shared qualities means a level of 
fragility must also exist inside God’s perfection. This is not to say that God is limited or hindered 
in any way, but rather that the connection that exists between God and humanity is such that God 
maintains the ability to share in human limitations within divine perfection. The limitations that 
exist within humanity are not indicative of God, but are ramifications of the human’s life on 
earth. In light of this, human limitations such as bodily disabilities are not consequences of 
mirroring the divine life. They are instead a reality of human existence on earth. In this, God 
remains the ideal of perfection that stands hierarchically above humanity, while still allowing 






















A Proposed Theological Anthropology of Disability  
 
 Gregory of Nyssa’s theological anthropology focuses on the body as the vehicle for the 
soul and the medium for interpersonal communication. This works to depict communication as 
the process of two bodies simultaneously perceiving and expressing the contents of their 
respective souls. Although the specific actions involved with communication can seem obvious, 
Gregory suggests that the body works to perceive and express on a variety of different planes. In 
order to look more intricately at the ways in which Gregory’s body works, this chapter looks at 
his theological anthropology through the lens of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Drew Leder, and Donn 
Welton, three philosophers who address the purpose and being of the body. Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the body helps further extrapolate Gregory’s understanding of how perception 
works in both visible and invisible ways. For Merleau-Ponty a person’s flesh exists not only as a 
perceptual tool, but also as a commonality that links all human beings, sharing parallels to 
Gregory’s Christological interpretation that Christ’s embodiment of flesh bonded Him to the 
flesh of humanity. Drew Leder provides a supplement to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the 
body by turning to the visceral nature of the inner organs. Leder suggests that although these 
body parts operate without conscious perceptual thought, they remain chiasmatically linked to 
the perceptual nature of the surface body. Leder’s understanding of the whole body’s capacity to 
perceive and express helps further push our understanding of Gregory’s theological 
anthropology. This is seen most evidently in Gregory’s depiction of his sister Macrina, whose 
illness prompted her to speak eloquently about the ways in which her blood and inner organs 
communicated with her physician. Donn Welton’s overlap with Gregory comes in his 
representation of the “habitual body,” which maintains that the body operates perceptually 
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without the necessity of intentionality or conscious thought. Welton’s habitual body is at all 
times limited, sharing similarities with the overarching lens of Gregory’s theology that human 
beings are finite in light of an infinite God. Welton’s habitual body thus helps to show the shared 
performative aspects of all bodies brought forth by Gregory, while still operating within the 
scope of finitude.  
 This chapter is a supplemental continuation of the theological anthropology of Gregory of 
Nyssa. The proposed applications of these contemporary philosophies do not exist as a way of 
imposing modern motifs that were originally absent from the Gregory canon, nor do they exist as 
a reductive reading of Gregory or presume that his doctrine can be explained away in regards to 
something else. Rather, the aim of this chapter is to approach Gregory’s view of the body 
through the lens of complimentary bodily interpretations in order to more intricately explain the 
ways in which Gregory’s theological anthropology applies to individuals with disabilities. This 
shows the ways in which Gregory of Nyssa is helpful in developing a theological anthropology 
of disability.   
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Lived Body and the Chiasm of the Flesh 
The French phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty emphasized the body as the 
primary location for knowledge of the world. This lens rejected the longstanding philosophical 
tradition of understanding consciousness as the source of knowledge. Instead, for Merleau-Ponty 
it is through the body that perception takes place, allowing the human being to engage with the 
world and create meaning from experience. In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty 
identifies the corps proper or “lived body” as the foundation for all human relation to the world. 
In this work, he considers perception in an immensely broad sense, which remains inextricably 
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linked to conscious bodily movement and concrete expressiveness through language.132 By 
establishing what Merleau-Ponty refers to as the “primacy of perception,” the Phenomenology of 
Perception calls into question Descartes’ body/soul dualism in favor of a more intentional 
concept of perception, a perception that takes place through human bodies. This shares parallels 
with the work of Gregory of Nyssa, who also focused on the soul’s relationship with the body in 
wake of a popular thought that was comfortable with the split of the two entities.  
In the working notes for The Visible and Invisible, which was Merleau-Ponty’s last 
completed work, the philosopher criticized his earlier work, “due to the fact that in part I retained 
the philosophy of ‘consciousnesses.”133 It was Merleau-Ponty’s desire for The Visible and 
Invisible to bring “ontological explication” to his previous works on phenomenology.134 
Merleau-Ponty wanted to explicate his previous work with a more corporeal understanding of the 
human body as perceiver. This means the body is able to perceive through a chiasmatic network 
of visible and invisible senses, which exceeds ontological categories.   
Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm of the body works to push the understanding of the body beyond 
that of a biological object. Through the lens of his “lived body,” Mearleau-Ponty works to depict 
the body as a vessel for human perception, responsible for generating meaning from interactions 
with the world. This is a body that mediates meaning, is mediated by meaning, and is thus the 
human being’s opening to meaningful being.135 This body’s natural inclination to perceive opens 
up meaningful possibilities for an articulation of theological anthropology.   
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To understand the chiasmic qualities of the flesh, Merleau-Ponty first creates an account 
of the lived body. The body exists as exemplar sensible, which allows the human person to have 
“the wherewithal to sense everything that resembles himself on the outside, such that, caught up 
in the tissue of the things, it draws it entirely to itself, incorporates it, and, with the same 
movement, communicates to the things upon which it closes over that identity without 
superposition…”136 Merleau-Ponty makes the argument that the body exists as both perceiver 
and perceived, similar to the sensations felt when one hand embraces another. Merleau-Ponty 
writes,  
We say therefore that our body is a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among 
things and otherwise what sees them and touches them; we say, because it is evident, that 
it unites these two properties within itself, and its double belongingness to the order of 
the “object” and to the order of the “subject” reveals to us quite unexpected relations 
between two orders. It cannot be by incomprehensible accident that the body has this 
double reference; it teaches us that each calls for the other.137 
 
The body has two functions that never quite coincide. There exists a sort of divergence that stops 
the phenomenal and objective body from merging.138 Yet, in Merleau-Ponty’s account there 
remains an “identity-in-difference.”139 This means that the two sides of the body that Merleau-
Ponty proposes do not exist as two separate ontological categories. It is important that the 
physical body is tangible and exists in the same world as other physical objects. The body is 
chiasmic because it has the ability to be both perceiver and perceived. This chiasm characterizes 
not only the nature of the human body, but also its relationship to the world.140 In considering the 
body as perceiver, Merleau-Ponty asserts that the human person is made up of the same sort of 
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flesh as the world they are interacting with. Drew Leder writes, “For Mereau-Ponty, the world is 
always world-as-perceived, clothed with the flesh of my gaze.”141  
Merleau-Ponty wanted to explicate his previous work with a more corporeal 
understanding of the human body as perceiver. He does this by supplanting his terminology of 
perception through the body with the ontological notion of “flesh” (la chair).142 For Merleau-
Ponty, flesh exists as a primal “element” for human beings.143 This means that flesh belongs 
neither to the subject, nor the world exclusively.144 Instead of being considered a material 
subject, human flesh acts as a unifying component of life that all human beings are born with. 
Merleau-Ponty’s exposé on the flesh, therefore, becomes a matter of chiasmus, or bodily 
interconnections, which exemplify human flesh.  
The significance for the mutuality of flesh is not seen in the ability of sight or other 
perceiving senses. Rather, it is the mutual reference and intertwining of all forms of 
perception.145 It is not important that all of humanity sees, feels, or smells the same things in the 
same way. Instead, significance is found in the understanding that all human beings have access 
to an interconnected system of perception. Merleau-Ponty writes, “My synergic body is not an 
object, that it assembles into a cluster the ‘consciousness’ adherent to its hands, to its eyes, by an 
operation that is in relation to them lateral, transversal…”146 It is the chiasmic connection of 
sense opportunity within the human body that connects humanity to the larger world around 
them, including to other perceivers. Without coinciding, an individual’s perspective stands in 
mutual validation to the perspective of another.  
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Merleau-Ponty also asserts that there is a chiasmatic relationship between the “visible” 
and the “invisible.” “Being is fleshed out by virtue of invisible dimensions which are not ‘non-
visibles’ opposed to perception but installed within the visible world.”147 This means that there is 
an invisibility that lines the human body. Correlatively, there is an invisible ideality that adheres 
to all sensible objects.148 Although a physical body can be seen and observed due to its 
corporeality, there is also an incorporeal nature that cannot be accounted for through physical 
observations. Merleau-Ponty writes,  
Meaning is invisible, but the invisible is not the contradictory of the visible; the visible 
itself has an invisible inner framework (membrure), and the in-visible is the secret 
counterpart of the visible, it appears only within it, it is the Nichturpräsentierbar which is 
presented to me as such within the world- one cannot see it there and every effort to see it 
there makes it disappear, but it is in the line of the invisible, it is its virtual focus, it is 
inscribed within it (in filigree)…The other’s visible is my invisible; my visible is the 
others invisible; this formula (that of Sarte) is not to be retained. We have to say: Being is 
this strange encroachment by reason of which my visible, although it is not superposable 
on that of the other, nonetheless opens up to it, that both open upon the same sensible 
world.149 
 
The ideality of visible and invisible is characterized, for Merleau-Ponty, in the human flesh. This 
includes language, which is embodied by the signifier.150 For words present in language are 
always dependent on the flesh, drawing meaning from an ideality which “already streams forth 
along the articulations of the aesthesiological body, along the contours of the sensible 
things…”151 Thus, the understanding of knowledge and communication garnered through senses, 
both visible and invisible, all fall under the umbrella of the chiasm of the human body. The flesh 
exceeds an ontology of perception.  
Gregory of Nyssa’s Lived Body and Chiasmus of the Flesh   
                                                 
147 Drew Leder, “Flesh and Blood: A Proposed Supplement to Merleau-Ponty,” 202. Leder is summarizing a variety 
of sections from The Visible and Invisible, including pp. 149, 215, 227-228, and 236.  
148 Ibid.  
149 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, 215-216.  
150 Drew Leder, “Flesh and Blood: A Proposed Supplement to Merleau-Ponty,” 202.  




 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the body helps to further clarify the 
theological anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa. Foundational to both approaches and 
understandings of the body is a rejection of dualism, inserting in its place the idea that the body 
and soul exist through one unified system. It is in this rejection that the body becomes more than 
a mere container for the soul or intellectual organs and instead finds its importance as the tool 
through which a person perceives the world around them. In light of this, the most obvious 
overlaps in thought are seen in Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the “lived body” as the 
foundational medium of perception and engagement with the world and Gregory’s concept of the 
body as the moderator of interpersonal communication.  
Gregory similarly prescribes ontological responsibility for the human body, which echoes 
the scholarship brought forth by Merleau-Ponty. One example of this is Gregory’s explanation of 
the “special advantage of reason” which emphasizes the human’s usefulness of organs to 
communicate effectively such as voice and hands.152 Although originally used by Gregory to 
separate the human from what he referred to as “non-rational animals,” this assessment also 
highlights parts of the body that function as perceivers and expressers. The Creator has given the 
human being body parts like hands, a mouth, and vocal chords in order to appropriately express 
human thought.153 Xueying Wang depicts Gregory’s portrayal of the body as a metaphor for 
human relationship:  
Besides the fact that different bodily members are joined together by functions to form a 
harmonious whole, an individual, once isolated from other human beings, is not 
complete. In other words a man or woman is bid by nature to reach out to others, and the 
body, through the organs which we convey our thoughts in words and in action, 
constitutes the indispensable medium for interpersonal communications.154  
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This interpretation of Gregory places the body’s perceptual compulsion as divinely preordained 
by God in creation. The importance of perception, for Gregory, is not limited to creating 
meaning from the world. Rather it becomes an essential task for fostering human relationships. 
The framework of human relationships rests in perceiving various things from interactions. 
Objects that a person values or ideas, items, and relationships they care about are all able to be 
perceived by those that they interact with. Perception therefore becomes paramount to the ways 
in which individuals grow closer to others. For example, if they perceive concerns and character 
qualities that are similar to their own, they are more likely to form a closer relationship. This is 
seen in Merleau-Ponty’s declaration that “all knowledge takes its place within the horizons 
opened up by perception.”155 Included in these horizons is knowledge garnered within human 
relationships. Gregory’s notion of a “lived body” is relational.  
  Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh is also useful in the consideration of Gregory’s 
theological anthropology. For Merleau-Ponty, flesh is portrayed as a tool for perception and 
touch, but is also seen as a unifying element that is a characteristic of all human beings. Flesh 
acts as a unifying agent for both perceiver and expresser, who, through flesh, find an “intimacy 
in the visible.”156 Flesh acts as a basis of commonality between all human beings. This 
understanding shares overtones of Gregory’s understanding of creations relationship with Christ, 
who took on human flesh. Johannes Zachuber refers to this as the “humanistic solution” within 
Gregory’s theology. Zachuber argues that, for Gregory, the divinity of Jesus is far less important 
than his humanity.157 Christ’s taking on flesh is vital to humanity’s call to imitation, which 
Zachhuber compares to “pupils, who learn to paint by looking at a well drawn picture, [just as] 
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human beings ought to learn perfection in the virtuous life from the perfect example set before 
them by Christ.”158 Christ’s taking on flesh provides a visible representation for the virtuous life 
for humanity to imitate. Human flesh works as a unifying agent, linking humanity to the eternal 
logos who shared the same flesh.  
Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the lived body helps to clarify Gregory’s theology of 
the body as medium for communications. However, Merleau-Ponty’s presentation of the lived 
body fails to show how the body exists as perceiver and expresser when the body’s tools of 
perception cease to function. The notion of ontological responsibility through the lived body 
alienates individuals whose bodies are disabled. What does Gregory’s assertion that human 
beings operate with a “special advantage of reason” mean if the hands or mouth do not operate in 
their fullest potential? Interpreting Gregory’s theological anthropology through the lens of 
disability requires a more comprehensive look at the body as a whole.  
Drew Leder’s Visceral Body 
 
Drew Leder proposes a supplement to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of perception that moves 
beyond the sentient/sensible surface of the body and rests on a deeper and visceral foundation.159 
Leder understands Merleau-Ponty’s lived body as a rejection of the Cartesian conflation of two 
separate entities (body and soul) by arguing that to view the body this way an account must be 
made for bodily intentionality. In regards to the lived body, Leder writes, “It holds that the body 
of a living being has an essential structure of its own which cannot be captured by the language 
and concepts used to explain inanimate nature. If one notion can be said to lie at the heart of this 
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paradigm, it is that the lived body is an ‘intending’ entity.”160 However, the human body exists as 
much more than the sensory organs that are consciously enacted to move or communicate. The 
phenomenological emphasis on the visible, surface body often means the disregard of the 
invisible, visceral body.  
 Leder points out that like the visible body, the visceral cannot properly belong to the 
subject.161 Rather, the visceral aspects of the body labors without conscious intention, granting 
life in ways a human has neither willed nor understood.162 These organs are not the medium 
through which the world is perceived or by which another perceiver recognizes a person. Leder 
also points out the natural inclination to think of these parts of the body as their own isolated 
entity writing, “In terms of motility, the ‘I can’ of the surface body gives way, on the visceral 
level, to something like an ‘it can.’”163 A human cannot choose to contract an inner organ in the 
same way they can contract a part of the surface body. Bodily actions like digestion or breathing 
are simply accomplished within a human, without intervention, guidance, or skill.164  
Although happening beyond the visible, these organs are still chiasmatically linked to the 
bodily life. Contemporary science is able to explain the appearance and function of these organs, 
and a surgeon can see and interact with them on the operating table. External organs that 
perceive are sustained by the labor of the internal and visceral.165 The eyes or ears, in part, rely 
on proper blood circulation or digestion in order to execute their responsibilities of sight or 
hearing. Leder’s bodily understanding does not work to undermine the chiasm brought forth by 
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Merleau-Ponty, but rather seeks to add a deeper dimension. That is, the body’s ability to perceive 
and express is not merely dependent on its external features.  
Where Merleau-Ponty would say that perception is only possible through the mutual 
exteriority of perceiver and perceived, Leder calls for a deeper relational ontology than exists 
through the perceptual communion of the flesh.166 By pushing the previously established 
ontological notion of flesh deeper, to include “blood,” Leder aims to express “the chiasmatic 
identity-in-difference of perceptual and visceral life.”167 This recognition of blood shows a 
mutual sustaining of relationship with the rest of creation. Blood is a part of the human being 
from birth and does not rely on outside force for acquisition. Leder writes, “In sleep I give 
myself over to anonymous breathing, relinquishing the separative stance of distance perception. 
Even waking perception is ultimately in service to the visceral.”168 It is thus through the visceral, 
coupled with the perceptual, that total interpretation of body and creation is actualized.  
 Through the lens of Merleau-Ponty, the human being discovers their own visibility and 
visibility of the world through the lens of another. Leder argues that although this is true, prior to 
the intertwining of external bodies from without, there is an intertwining of internal bodies from 
within.169 Beginning in birth a lived body is formed from within that of another, thus challenging 
the Merleau-Ponty concept of the visible and invisible. These described invisibilities all rely in 
some capacity on an expressive body, ultimately concluding in bodily language.170 Leder 
alternatively suggests that the understanding of invisibility does not only include Merleau-
Ponty’s understanding of flesh as perceptual unit, but also forgotten visceral organs that make 
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external perception possible. He writes, “The visceral organs, the fetal body from which I 
emerge, the sleeping body into which I lapse, are regions ineluctably hidden from my perception. 
Yet my lived world is textured by this unconscious vitality, as much as by the sublimations of 
language and thought.”171 
It is true that Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of bodily perception supersedes 
intellectual or physical capability by rooting the tools for perceiver/perceived in the flesh. 
However, this phenomenological understanding leaves large portions of the body unrepresented. 
By accounting for the visceral nature of the human body, Drew Leder develops an embodiment 
of perception that portrays external and internal sensory organs through the same lens of 
importance. This depiction thus creates a more in depth relational ontology, because interactions 
between the perceiver and the perceived are not limited to the perception that takes place at the 
external level. Instead, perceiver and perceived are already intricately connected due to their 
shared blood and viscerality. Not only does this interpretation continue to include all human 
beings regardless of ability, but it also works to include the entirety of the human body.  
Gregory of Nyssa and the Visceral Body  
 
 An engagement of viscerality within Gregory of Nyssa’s theological anthropology begins 
in creation. To think critically about the ways in which internal and external organs exist in 
cohesion, as tools of perception, requires careful consideration of the ways in which God created 
humans to exist.172 Chapter One of this thesis, in part, explores the ways in which Gregory views 
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humanity as the imago Dei. An aspect of this aforementioned explanation was that human beings 
exist as the imago Dei because they are able to oversee features of creation (plants, animals, etc.) 
in a way that is analogous to how God governs humanity. To realize this, it can be assumed that 
God first decided prior to the creation of humanity what faculties were necessary to exert this 
sort of dominion over the earth. There are obvious body parts that come to mind when 
considering the human responsibility to lead creation: a torso, legs that facilitate quick movement 
and the ability to walk upright, and opposable thumbs and fingers that allow a hand to grasp and 
carry. However, this preordained structure must have also accounted for interior organs. It is the 
visceral tissue that sustains the body’s life, thus making it possible to govern creation. The 
visceral component of the human body is therefore central to the person’s existence as imago 
Dei. Vital to this incorporation of the visceral body into the theology of Gregory is the 
understanding that God endows life to humanity, not mere existence. This automatic labor of 
visceral organs and blood takes place detached from a person’s own energies, showing that, God 
sustains life without assistance from humanity.  
Due to the restricted medical knowledge in his day, Gregory’s engagement with the inner 
workings of the body is somewhat limited. In De anima et resurrection, Gregory and Macrina 
discuss the teleology of known bodily organs. The understanding of the current human body and 
what it will transition to in the post-resurrected state influences the discourse between the 
siblings. Although attempting to create an account for all aspects of the body and focusing 
mostly on external organs, Macrina and Gregory indirectly speak of the significance of the 
visceral. Macrina accounts for all aspects of the body in her claim that “nature has made no part 
of the body useless,” arguing that bodily organs all serve an explicit need.173 Yet, a deeper look 
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into the rhetoric of De anima et resurrection suggests a more intimate connection between the 
visceral organs and the soul. Macrina says, 
If we desire to know ourselves, in obedience to that wise precept, the soul itself teaches 
us well enough what we should understand about the soul, namely that it is immaterial 
and bodiless, working and moving in accord with its own nature, and revealing its 
motions by means of the bodily organs. For the same arrangement of the bodily organs 
exists in the corpses of the dead, but the soul remains immobile and not activated by the 
psychic power which is no longer in it. It is moved when perception resides in the organs 
and intellectual power pervades perception, moving the organs of perception along with 
its own impulses as it chooses.174 
 
Here, Gregory uses Macrina’s voice to establish the way the soul moves inside the body. This 
involves being housed in the vessel of the body and permeating throughout external sense organs 
in order to perceive the world and express its inner contents. It also entails living in and among 
the visceral. Macrina addresses the arrangement of bodily organs in a corpse suggesting that she 
is referring to inner organs, which would be most visible after death. Not only is the soul housed 
in the bodily vessel with the visceral organs, but the life giving force of the visceral organs also 
aids in the bodily ability to perceive and express.  
Gregory pushes this further by transcribing an ill Macrina’s thoughts about her 
interactions with her physician. Macrina says, 
The evidence for what I have said is close at hand. How does this man by laying his 
fingers on my artery hear somehow through the sense of touch how my nature calls out to 
him and explains its own condition? Because the sickness of my body is increasing; the 
disease arises from these internal organs, and the increase of the inflammation extends 
this far.”175  
 
In this context Macrina suggests that the hand of the doctor acts as perceiver, and the blood  
flowing through her artery acts as expresser. This shows the communicative properties of the 
visceral.  
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The visceral links humanity in its nature as a universal reality. This commonality of the 
visceral among humanity takes place regardless of ability or bodily characteristics. The visceral 
organs preserve life, without effort, freeing up the human being to use their sense organs to 
perceive and communicate. The visceral also has the capacity to communicate wants, needs, and 
passions of the body on its own, as seen in the interaction between Macrina and her doctor. Thus, 
to consider the communicative nature of the body, Gregory creates an account for the theological 
role of the visceral.  
Donn Welton and the Habitual Body 
 
 The body, within the theology of Gregory of Nyssa, is able to perceive and express in 
ways that supersede conscious thought. Bodies naturally depict emotion, intent, feelings, etc. 
without the need for human intellect to trigger bodily movements. This is particularly seen 
through the lens of the body as visceral, considering the work that inner organs put into bodily 
gestations such as digestion or breathing, without instruction from the brain. The absence of 
conscious thought in these particular bodily functions prompt the body to be understood as 
operating habitually. This is the approach of the philosopher Donn Welton, who outlines four 
interconnected dimensions that, when combined, make up a “habitual body.” These dimensions 
are: perceptual, pathetic, praxical, and dispositional. Welton’s view of the body suggests that the 
importance of the human person is not that they possesses a body, mind, or soul. Rather, the 
significance of the body rests in the fact that these actions are done habitually. Although all four 
dimensions exist as an intricately established matrix, this thesis focuses specifically on the 




Welton’s notion of the perceptual body stands out due to the limitations he places on the 
human being. It is not Welton’s objective to deny that the body has perceptual abilities, but he 
does want to highlight that there is a finitude to the body’s perception.176 Objects that are 
perceived are always given from one side, thus being perceived by a singular perspective. 
Welton writes, “If we take the ideal of an object given according to all its perspectives as our 
definition of adequate givenness, then perception must be understood as essentially 
inadequate.”177 Because a person’s perception is isolated, objects that are perceived are thus seen 
inadequately and in limited fashion. This is no fault of the human, but rather a realization that 
what compromises a person’s cognitive abilities is the inadequacy of the human being. In 
communication, a perceiver can only act and work in relation to an expresser. If an expresser is 
absent, there is no body for the perceiver to perceive, and without a perceiver, the body has no 
direction to express. This dependency brings with it the recognition that the human body is 
situated.  
Welton’s perceptual body works to show that although the human body is at all times 
perceiving, the entirety of the world can never be perceived all at one time. The body as situated 
means that the body is finite.178 It is within finitude that the human being is able to perceive. 
Welton writes,  
Each side or profile given indicates a whole which exceeds what is directly given, a 
whole whose presence can be understood only by recourse to that movement of 
indication that forms the core of perceptual intentionality, by recourse to what, strictly 
speaking, “transgresses” the side perceived as we see the object as a whole with its 
backside. The first seven notes of Beethoven’s Ninth may be ringing in our ears yet it is 
the symphony that we are listening to…Whether it be a “passive” expectation in which 
our gaze is guided only by the present course of perception or an “active” anticipation in 
which we are deliberately looking for something, we can be mistaken only about what is 
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coming but, as new experience retroactively reframes our past and present cognitions, 
also about what we already know. This is not an accidental but an essential part of 
embodied experience. As finite we are also fallible. Without the capacity to err we would 
lack the capacity to perceive.179 
 
Human fallibility thus becomes an essential part of a person’s aptitude for perception. This 
places all human beings on equal footing for perceptual ability, with limitedness acting as a 
peculiar sort of asset for the body’s ability to perceive and express with the rest of creation.  
Human finitude, that is, the shortcomings in perception highlighted by Welton in his 
perceptual body, is also built into the structure and actions of the pathetic body. This account of 
finitude is dependent upon rescinding an abstraction of objects and body, viewed through 
cognition. Rescinding this abstraction shows the ways in which the body exists as pathetic, 
ultimately allowing a way to account for the passion and pathos of the body.180 For Welton, the 
body is situated by the desirability of objects. Passions enter into human beings’ interpretation of 
an object, distorting or enhancing it, and leading to new acts of perception and desire. Desire 
thus shapes a person’s perception based on the limitations of the human person because “desire 
is reconfigured by the rhythms of need.”181 Welton encapsulates this idea by considering human 
touch, proposing that touch establishes a circuit of exchanges in which two bodies become one 
flesh, and each person becomes a part of the other.182 Welton writes, “Because this reaches into 
dimensions of our being that only an occasional poet of singers have been able to articulate, we 
should not think of this exchange as a form of communication so much as a form of 
communion.”183  
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Touch thus becomes crucial in the human attempt to overcome characteristics of the 
pathetic body. Touch exists as the medium for interaction with the desired object or desiring 
flesh. Welton writes, “In extending its hands, in reaching for what is desired, the flesh senses 
itself directly but still as only limited and delimited.”184 This means that the flesh is never fully 
transparent to the person who occupies it, for it knows itself only through the situations that call 
it forth.185 The various faculties of touch, in its ability to heal and express/perceive, discloses the 
body at its most pathetic. The crux of this line of thinking is not merely that bodies move beyond 
ways in which they make or unmake sense of the world, but rather that the emotions leading to 
desire or aversion are both, at times, present and absent, and have the capacity to shape a body 
which is both finite and fallible. Creation is not simply the backdrop of where the human person 
lives, but rather the living entity that the human being engages with through desires and dislikes. 
Human finitude postures the person to fallibility, which ultimately shapes them to vulnerability. 
Welton’s praxical body attempts to move from the “docile” to the “dexterous” body by 
highlighting the various ways the body exercises power and has power exercised on itself.186 The 
praxical context depicts the body engaging its surroundings through muscles and joints, as well 
as the dexterity that is required to incorporate the use of tools to better exploit the body’s 
interaction with its surroundings. In this, again, is the awareness of the body’s limitation in doing 
tasks. Although a person can condition the body to be in its peak physical or mental state to 
perform a task or incorporate a tool for more precise execution, the limit to the powers of the 
body creates frequent scenarios of limitation and failure at tasks. This leads to what Welton 
refers to as, “the fallibility of the praxical body.187 
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 The concepts of finitude, fallibility, and vulnerability are collected in Welton’s notion of 
the interconnected habitual body. For Welton, this shifts the understanding of the body from one 
of finitude and fallibility to one of “fallenness.” This move entails a pivot away from a 
phenomenology of the body that deals with the body in regards to its possibilities, and moves to 
a hermeneutic of the signs, symbols, and narratives that place the body in the difficult balance of 
affirming life in light of death.188 Welton writes,  
This shift allows us to capture our fallenness in a way that does not turn it back into an 
issue of finitude. The approach I am pursuing here, then, rejects the thesis that finitude 
and its experiential counterpart in fragility constitutes the fallenness of our body in 
particular and our existence in general. Finitude creates the possibility of fallenness, not 
its necessity. As a result it is crucial to distinguish those structural features of the flesh 
that place it as an essential dimension of our being human from the specific configuration 
and deployment of the flesh in its concrete living.189 
 
Welton calls this idea of fallenness, as it relates to the habitual body, the “bondage of the body,” 
suggesting that the inclination of the body to chase its directions and its powers always lead the 
body away from itself, writing that the “body as habitual becomes the body as the residual effect 
of perverse finitude.”190  
Gregory of Nyssa and the Habitual Body  
 
 The finitude and fallenness that become vital parts of Donn Welton’s habitual body are 
prominent aspects of Gregory of Nyssa’s theological anthropology. For Gregory, human beings 
are always limited. Gregory often portrays human finitude through two frequently visited topics: 
limitedness in ability compared to the divine, and the comprehension of dying and the afterlife. 
Gregory often uses the concept of diastema to signify the limitedness of creation. Everything the 
human being identifies is known through a diastematic manner. This not only means that human 
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beings’ perception takes place within a fixed timeframe, but also what is perceived is something 
determinate, a diastema defined by limits.191 Conversely, the adiastematic God can never be 
comprehended, not even in an infinitely long interval of time.192 Included within God’s 
limitlessness is incomprehensibility to diastemic thought.193 The diastemic character of the 
human being and the adiastemic infinity of God acts as the framework for understanding the 
human life as a limitless movement towards the infinite goodness of God.194 Infinity, acting as 
the absence of an end, thus becomes of paramount importance for the human being, providing 
the orientation for them to pursue the infinite perfection of the divine through the process of 
epektasis. Because of this orientation, the posturing of human beings towards the perfection of 
the divine is portrayed, in a sense, as habitual.  
 The assertion of human limitedness in Gregory’s theological anthropology includes 
perceptual abilities, in a way that is analogous to Donn Welton’s perceptual body. One way that 
Gregory shows the limitations of perception is to portray them in an apophatic sense. This is seen 
in Gregory’s attempt at deciphering what happens to a person’s mind and perceptual senses when 
they fall asleep.195 By recalling the aforementioned three faculties of the human soul (nutritive, 
sensory, and rational), Gregory believes that when a person sleeps the vegetative actions keeps 
their body alive. The mind does not experience any perception, and the only activity it 
experiences is dreaming.196 In his depiction of dreaming, Gregory is therefore depicting a 
situation where a mind is active, yet disconnected from the senses. Both Gregory and Welton 
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depict a human body with sophisticated communicative functions, while still maintaining a 
fragility that is constantly limiting the body.  
 By creating an account of a perceiving body that is finite, Welton inadvertently helps 
decipher Gregory’s theology of epektasis. Welton writes,  
Finitude means more than the idea that our acts of cognition have no resting place, that 
they cascade into an open future without an end; it also means that each new point of 
view displaces others, setting them in the shadows, that each act of uncovering also 
involves covering.197 
 
Similarly, human growth in epektasis involves a similar path of continual growth, where the 
knowledge the human being gains through perception has no resting place. Yet, this does not 
mean that the perpetual progress accomplished exists as an open future without end. Rather, 
human nature is always being disposed to reach a greater good.198 Progress in epektasis is not 
wasted due to the absence of a goal that portrays God as unreachable entity. Instead, Gregory is 
suggesting that human finitude is such, that even if God is possessed, God’s nature as infinite 
surpasses the finitude of humanity.199 
 In Welton’s depiction of the pathetic body, the body is situated by the desirability of 
objects. The desirability or rejections of particular objects influence a person’s ability to create 
meaning from perceptions. The influence of human passions is also a primary concern within the 
theological anthropology of Gregory. For Welton, human desires prevent human beings from 
being able to perceive objects to their fullest extent. For Gregory, these same passions distract 
the person from fully living in the light of divine perfection. Gregory speaks allegorically of the 
human responsibility to manage their passions, comparing it to their interaction with creation. 
Just as human beings should govern over non-rational animals, so too should the rational mind 
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reign over the sensual desires.200 Gregory looks at the story of Eve in creation to demonstrate this 
point. Human rationality would suggest that obedience to an almighty God is self-evident. 
However, Eve ignores the understanding of her rationality and instead chooses to follow her own 
impulses shaped by desire. Gregory thus suggests that desire often causes human beings to 
ignore their natural relationship with God, a proclivity which Gregory refers to as the “passionate 
disposition.”201 Gregory is therefore depicting the person as losing sight of their full capacity for 
perception due to the distortion caused by human passion. In light of Gregory’s depiction of 
human finitude, this shows the place for the pathetic body inside Gregory’s theological 
anthropology.  
 Gregory’s theological anthropology through the lens of Welton’s habitual body creates 
space for the perceptual nature of the body to exist because of the finitude and fragility of the 
human person. This is in accordance with Gregory’s understanding of the body as the medium 
for interpersonal communication, while also preserving the natural hierarchy of a perfect God 
existing above a flawed humanity. This hierarchical understanding is at all times in the 
background of Gregory’s theology and also works to develop the existential gap that is covered 
through the human progress made in epektasis. Gregory portrays human finitude as a limitation, 
which a human being does not have the opportunity to overcome. The body affords all of 
humanity the opportunity to perceive and express, and move closer to the perfection of God. 
However, this ability to perceive and express takes place within a boundary, a boundary that 
prevents humanity from ever overcoming its fragile nature and achieving equal footing with the 
infinite and perfect God. Humanity has the capacity to perceive glimpses of God’s divine 
perfection and beauty, but never fully grasp its depths.  
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 Gregory of Nyssa portrays the body as a vibrant and multifaceted communicator that 
works to express the contents of the soul. Although his writing speaks in depth to various 
locations and abilities of the human body, the limited medical knowledge of his day contained 
the extent in which he was able to pursue these ontological connections. However, the themes 
present in Gregory’s theological anthropology find themselves in the work of other authors, three 
of which have been the focus of this chapter. The aim in applying these philosophers is not to 
challenge or replace the thought of Gregory, but rather to add auxiliary commentary to the 
theologian’s limited writings on the subject.  
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s similarities with Gregory begin in their mutual understanding 
that the body is the primary location for knowledge of the world. Merleau-Ponty believes the 
body to be working through a chiasm of interlinked senses that provide the human being with 
their perceptual network. This chiasm prescribes an intricate connection between components of 
the body that are visible and invisible sense abilities that work to provide the foundations for 
human knowledge. A major aspect of the bodily chiasmus is the flesh, which exists as a unifying 
component of mutuality that all humans share. Merleau-Ponty’s ontological assessment of the 
lived body shares much in common with Gregory’s belief that the body exists as the medium for 
the tasks of perception and expression. In the same way that Merleau-Ponty believes that the 
body gives human beings the ability to acquire knowledge of the world, Gregory claims that the 
parts of the body give the human a “special advantage of reason.”202 For both Merleau-Ponty and 
Gregory the body is needed in order to develop human relationships, which in turn provide 
knowledge of the world. The idea that all humans share the components of the human body, such 
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as flesh, emphasizes the unification. Gregory pushes his concept of a shared body into the divine 
by uniting elements of the body with Christ’s human body.  
 Although including both the visible and the invisible in his work on the body, Merleau-
Ponty left space open for considerations of the visceral natures of the body. Drew Leder filled 
this space in his supplement to the work of Merleau-Ponty. Like the visible, the visceral cannot 
properly belong to the subject. It is still chiasmatically linked to the life of the visible, but its 
work is done underneath the surface, sustaining the external sense organs without conscious 
thought. Leder’s supplement to Merleau-Ponty supersedes intellectual or physical capability by 
rooting the foundations of perception in the whole body. Gregory, too, has concerns for the 
visceral nature of the body. Beginning in his thoughts on creation, Gregory asserts that God’s 
work endows life to humanity, not merely existence, emphasizing the sustaining work completed 
within the viscerality of the body. For Gregory, visceral organs show the ways in which God 
sustains life without assistance from humanity. This message is reemphasized in dialogue with 
Macrina, who affirms to Gregory the usefulness of visceral components such as blood and 
internal organs.  
 The ways the visceral sustains the body, without the necessity of conscious thought 
commanding the organs to perform, brings to light the ways in which the human body operates 
on its own accord. This is the basis of the habitual body outlined by Donn Welton who thinks 
critically about how the body is always engaged in perceptual interactions with the world. 
Welton suggests that although the body always perceives, the vastness of the world means that it 
is impossible for the body to perceive everything. This places limits on what the body is able to 
do, while still recognizing its skill in perception. Human limitation is a cornerstone in the 
theology of Gregory, spoken of most frequently in his understanding of diastema. The separation 
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of diastemic and adiastemic in Gregory’s work speak to his hierarchical divide between God and 
humanity. This provides the backdrop for epektasis, the perpetual progress of human beings from 
limited lives to God’s unlimited perfection. For both Welton and Gregory, this separation is 
partly due to the abuse of human passions. Donn Welton shows the ways in which passions 
prevent a person from perceiving everything, whereas for Gregory human passions limit access 
to perfection. Ultimately, Welton aids in providing clarity to Gregory’s thoughts on perception, 
while still maintaining the limited nature of humanity that is vital to Gregory’s theological 
anthropology.  
Nyssa, Merleau-Ponty, Leder, and Welton all have in common an understanding of the 
body as an intricately linked system of perceptual senses that exist visibly and invisibly, 
externally and internally. The body is always perceiving and expressing, in both conscious and 
unconscious ways. Although this sort of capability seems infinite, the human being remains 
limited in their perception. However, the theme in common among all of these depictions of the 
body remains the ability for any human to have access to these perceptual abilities, regardless of 
mental or physical deficiencies. The body’s chiasmatic connection allows for bodily deficiencies 
to be circumvented by transitioning the site of perception to a more functional sense. Similarly, 
because the body perceives in unconscious and habitual ways, there exists no minimum 
intellectual ability necessary for perception to take place. By examining Gregory’s thought from 
the perspectives of Merleau-Ponty, Leder, and Welton, an argument has been made that Gregory 
of Nyssa’s understanding of the body and the ways in which it communicates exists as an 








Gregory of Nyssa and Disability Theory  
 
 So far, the thesis has shown that Gregory of Nyssa’s theological anthropology can be 
more thoroughly discussed in unison with contemporary philosophical considerations of the 
human body. By considering Gregory alongside these phenomenologists with a focus on their 
openness to individuals with disabilities, an account has been created of the ways in which 
Gregory’s theology is able to speak to a contemporary theology of disability. This chapter turns 
to the field of disability studies by focusing on two theorists who have significantly impacted the 
ways in which disability is approached, Tobin Siebers and Fiona Kumari Campbell. Tobin 
Siebers is famous for his theory of “disability aesthetics,” which is meant to be a critical concept 
that seeks to emphasize the presence of disability within the tradition of aesthetic 
representation.203 Aesthetic considerations of beauty also exist as a common motif within the 
theology of Gregory. Looking at Siebers through the lens of Gregory shows that perfection is 
unable to exist as a standard of beauty for humanity and is only able to be seen in God. Fiona 
Kumari Campbell combines her interests of disability studies and pedagogy to show the ways 
individuals with disabilities should be considered to have a privileged status as it relates to 
positions of instruction. For Campbell, the character qualities and disposition that are required 
for living in the world with disabilities transition nicely to what is required for an impactful 
instructor. This appeal for individuals with disabilities lends itself agreeably to Gregory of 
Nyssa’s depiction of virtuous models, particularly seen in his relationship with his sister 
Macrina. A dialogue between Gregory and Campbell helps to show how an individual with 
disabilities exists as a model of virtue. This lesson will be revisited in the final chapter, which 
will apply Gregory of Nyssa’s theological understanding of the human body to my work in the 
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field of developmental disabilities. This will show the ways in which Gregory’s thought speaks 
to the current discussion of disability.  
Disability Studies  
 
 The in depth study of disability is still a relatively new phenomenon within the academy. 
After all, it took an extended amount of time for the condition of being labeled as “disabled” to 
be thought of as an oppression, instead of an uncomplicated description of someone else’s body. 
Until fairly recently, the existence and interpretation of individuals with disabilities were most 
often thought of to be bad luck, which unfortunately worked to limit the person’s ability to be 
fully incorporated into society. The turning point is difficult to pinpoint, but the approval of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by bipartisan majorities in 1990 provided a level of 
protection for individuals with disabilities against discrimination in employment, public 
accommodations and transportation, and telecommunications.204 Although the true benefits of 
the ADA are often contested, the bill ultimately worked to bring awareness of the plights of 
individuals with disabilities to the attention of the mainstream consciousness.  
 With The ADA was a reliance on a sociopolitical model of disability, which replaced a 
more medical/clinical approach to disability that had been prevalent since the 1960s.205 Broadly, 
the medical model of disability seeks to focus on ways of medically assisting a person in order to 
better adapt them to society. Examples of this are performing surgeries, therapies, or developing 
tools that cover for bodily deficiencies. Although, at times, biomedical intervention is an 
appropriate way to enhance a person’s quality of life, disability advocates who prescribe to a 
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more social model of inclusion have criticized the medical model.206 The social model provides a 
more complex view of disability and disability-related discrimination by focusing upon the 
relationship between an individual’s impairment and the nature of the environment in which the 
specific individual must function.207 The medical model creates an unintended social degradation 
of individuals with disabilities by being narrowly focused on biomedical solutions for disability, 
instead of a concern for practices that involve societal inclusionary practices.  
 Although the ADA was hardly the beginning of the social model of disability or the 
academic study of disability theory, its use of social methodology marked a turn towards public 
awareness and inclusive dispositions. As the ADA worked to bring disability into the public 
consciousness, the social method simultaneously worked to create more academic interest for the 
study of disabilities from an array of academic disciplines. In short, disability studies seeks to 
understand the meaning, significance, and nature of disability. Unlike other methodological 
lenses, which are more or less permanent for a person’s life, disability has the potential to impact 
everyone at any given moment in life, in both direct and indirect ways. The broad nature of what 
can be classified as a disability means that most people will experience some impairment in their 
lifetime. Eloquently summarized by Tobin Siebers, “The disabled body exists as a symbol of the 
trauma of modern life and a call to discover a more inclusive and realistic conception of culture, 
one that recognizes the fragility as well as the violence of human existence.”208  
Tobin Siebers Disability Aesthetics  
 
 Gregory’s understanding of human finitude in light of an almighty God casts all of 
humanity through a lens of limitation. Although bound to finitude, humanity still has the ability 
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to catch glimpses of divine beauty due to its existence as the imago Dei. Thus, an account must 
be made for beauty existing in human limitations of the body and mind. Present in Gregory’s 
hierarchical understanding of the relationship between God and humanity is the perception that 
perfection cannot provide the only standard for beauty. This is also a central argument to the 
disability theorist Tobin Siebers’ 2010 monograph Disability Aesthetics.  
 In this work, Siebers strives to look through the lens of human disability as a way of 
asking what constitutes beauty. For Siebers, the human body exists as both the subject and object 
of aesthetic production, but all bodies are not created equal when it comes to aesthetic 
response.209 To look at the concept of aesthetics through the lens of disability means to reject the 
representation of a healthy body as a definer of harmony, integrity, beauty, etc. In short, 
aesthetics studies the way that bodies make other bodies feel.210 Moreover, aesthetics stresses 
that feelings that are created from bodies are generated involuntarily, as if they are representative 
of a form of unconscious communication between bodies.211 Siebers refers to this as a 
“contagious possession of one body by another.”212 He writes,  
Whether the effect is beauty and pleasure, ugliness or pain, or sublimity and terror, the 
emotional impact of the body on another is experienced as an assault on autonomy and a 
testament to the power of otherness. Aesthetics is the human science most concerned with 
invitations to think and feel otherwise about our own influence, interests, and 
imagination.213 
 
Siebers argues that the body’s role as communicator is at all times depicting positive and 
negative emotions of acceptance or rejection. Although this leaves open the possibility of 
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undesirable bodily communications, this also leaves the body open to perceive and express 
beauty.   
 For Siebers, the exclusion of perfection from within beauty is a vital part of social justice. 
To narrowly think of beauty as consisting of perfection is to risk subjecting anyone or anything 
not seen as perfect to “disqualification.” Disqualification, as a symbolic process, removes 
individuals from the ranks of quality human beings, putting them at risk of unequal treatment.214 
Siebers attests that individuals with disabilities are often considered as non-quality human 
beings, a qualification that goes unnoticed despite being a ramification of the most serious and 
characteristic injustices of our day.215 To think of beauty, without the inclusion of imperfections, 
is to justify discrimination, marginalization, and an unwillingness to learn or mature from 
interactions with individuals with disabilities. Disqualification is justified through the accusation 
of mental or physical inferiority based on aesthetic principles.216 
 Bodily communication is therefore subjected to acceptances and rejections from the 
bodies it comes into contact with. In communication, senses revolt against aspects of some 
bodies, and are drawn to aspects of others.217 This occurrence shows the ways in which human 
fragility takes place within human interactions. Aspects of a person viewed as weak by one 
person can be appealing to another. Thus, human fragility has the capacity to be aesthetically 
pleasing. Fragility is constituent of human beauty. This becomes the lens from which Siebers 
suggests beauty is to be seen. Disability aesthetics embraces beauty that seems, by traditional 
standards, to be broken by contending that human fragility does not make human bodies less 
beautiful, but more so. Disability has the ability to enlarge the vision of human variation and 
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difference, ultimately putting forward a perspective that tests presuppositions dear to the subject 
of aesthetics.218 This has to do with the understanding that communicative responses to bodies 
are involuntary, reacting to instinctive feelings of being drawn to or revolted by fragile bodies.  
Gregory of Nyssa’s Disability Aesthetics  
 The significance of aesthetics to human life is an idea not lost on Gregory of Nyssa. 
Significant for Gregory’s notion of what is beautiful is the inclusiveness that he attaches to it. 
Because of Gregory’s consideration of the limitations of humanity, his understanding of beauty 
is able to overcome typical societal restrictions and live inside a more all-encompassing 
otherness. Natalie Carnes puts it this way, “Gregory of Nyssa claims more for beauty. He 
invokes a beauty that itself resists oppression, hunger, and suffering…The way Gregory locates 
the beauty in which beautiful objects, actions, and people participate positions beauty to 
challenge assimilation to cruelty and sloth.”219 Gregory’s understanding of beauty, like his 
theological language, is formed through the difficulties of human reality.220 This is not to say the 
difficulties of human life are in themselves beautiful, or that beauty exists apart from objects that 
evoke ugliness or revulsion. Instead, Gregory’s understanding of the relationship between 
humanity and aesthetics is a matter of perception. How does a person posture themselves in order 
to perceive beauty correctly? For Gregory, this means asking the Holy Spirit to assist the 
individual in guidance.221 The influence of objects typically deemed as contradictory to beauty 
has the opportunity to be overcome in epektasis, ultimately reshaping humanity’s ability to 
perceive.  
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 One clear example of Gregory’s juxtaposition between negative objects and beauty is his 
descriptions of the self as wounded. Carnes describes Gregory’s approach to the human self as 
wounded by saying, “For Gregory, woundedness primarily describes, not the self that fails to see 
Christ, but the self that does see Christ.”222 Within the cannon of Gregory, writing on the process 
of being wounded and healed is primarily found in the Homilies on the Song of Songs, and shares 
strong theological themes with the process of epektasis. Gregory writes,  
For Paul too, who bore the mark of such blows, similarly exulted in wounds of this sort 
when he said “I bear on my body the marks of Christ (Gal. 6:17), displaying that 
weakness in every vice by which the power that belongs to Christ is brought to perfection 
in virtue. By these words, then, he shows us that the wound too is an admirable thing. It 
occasions the stripping off of the Bride’s veil, so that the soul’s beauty is revealed once 
her covering no longer obscures it.223  
 
A member of the Trinity being responsible for wounding is a common motif within Gregory’s 
Homilies on the Song of Songs.224 In the above passage, Paul associates his wounds with the 
wounds of Christ, thus making the marks admirable. Through the connection with Christ, the 
wound retains its connections to love, but the wound association with beauty is made more 
explicit.225 When shared with Christ, the wound is beautiful and disclosive of beauty.226 In this 
text, the wound is portrayed as beautiful. It then is the catalyst for the Bride to remove her veil, 
allowing for her own beauty to be more visible, and removing the obstacle for her to be able to 
more clearly perceive the beauty around her. Gregory, through Paul, is arguing that human 
beings need to first be wounded in order to more aptly see beauty.  
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 Gregory is creating a countercultural argument against the typical standards of aesthetics. 
Although the notion of perfection as a standard of beauty is certainly present within the theology 
of Gregory, it is only applicable to the divine beauty that is found in God. This means that 
perfection cannot be a standard for beauty within creation. Instead, it is necessary to include the 
wounded body, or the body that is less than what society deems as typical, as part of the standard 
for what is considered aesthetic. It is through this disabling body that the human is able to know 
God’s beauty and strive toward it. To know God’s beauty is to be wounded.  
Fiona Kumari Campbell and the Standard for Pedagogical Models  
 The ability to perceive aesthetics requires the person to reorient their perception of beauty 
to include human limitation. Gregory attests that this allows humanity to see glimpses of the 
divine. This stands beside another aspect of Gregory’s theology of epektasis: that time spent with 
virtuous models positively impacts a person’s perpetual progress towards God’s perfection. 
However, what is the criterion for someone to be considered a virtuous model? Societal 
interpretations of perfection and virtue will influence a person’s understanding of virtuous 
models to a certain degree, but this too should be challenged. In the same way that perfection 
does not provide the only standard for beauty, perfection does not provide the only standard for 
virtue. This creates space for individuals with physical or mental disabilities to exist as virtuous 
models. The claim for inclusion of disabilities into a person’s pedagogical models does not end 
with mere equality; it extends to argue that, as it relates to instructing, disabled bodies are 
entitled to a privileged status.   
 The idea that the living of disablement imbued in the disabled teaching body shapes 
pedagogical performances is the thesis of the seventh chapter in Fiona Kumari Campbell’s 
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Contours of Ableism.227 Campbell looks at disability through the lens of pedagogy as a way of 
arguing that disability status is not merely a personal, and therefore private, issue.228 Rather, 
there is a “necessity for the disabled teaching body to be present within classroom settings in 
order for students to fully grasp the complex distilling of disability and the differences that 
different bodies make to the learning enterprise.”229 Campbell argues that the disabled body, in 
its performance of disability, invokes a process of self-emptying, or a sort of interior kenosis, on 
the part of the disabled instructor.230 By self-emptying, she is referring to a radical disclosure of 
disablement that occurs through the imparting of bodily gesture, mental presence, differential 
reference points, and passionate emphasis during moments when a disabled body is teaching.231 
These aspects of self-emptying are not entirely absent in a nondisabled body, but the level of 
vulnerability that is necessitated is more difficult to unearth in a body that is not considered 
“other.”  
 Campbell’s rendering of the disabled body through a pedagogical lens ultimately works 
to advance standard notions of interpersonal learning experiences. She offers the example of a 
class taught by a disabled professor. Although initially postured as a diverse class learning from 
a singular professor with disabilities, Campbell argues that a person with disabilities being 
afforded a privileged status through their own subconscious self-emptying transcends the barriers 
of the classroom. This establishes that individuals with physical or intellectual disabilities not 
only have the same capacity to teach as everyone else, but also are more inclined to portray 
wisdom that is rooted in a self-emptying vulnerability.  
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Gregory of Nyssa and the Standard for Pedagogical Models  
 
 Fiona Kumari Campbell’s exploration of the ways disability impacts pedagogy casts new 
light on Gregory of Nyssa’s concept of virtuous models. Gregory’s theology maintains the 
importance of body for conveying virtues interpersonally. When one body learns and matures 
from the virtue of another body, epektasis and the perpetual progress toward a virtuous life 
become more easily achieved. Although Gregory leaves space for the qualifications of “more” 
and “less” virtuous bodies, his understanding of the natural hierarchy that exists between God 
and humanity suggests that although a person can be virtuous, they still exists within the 
confinement of limitations that is indicative of creation. Because of this, Campbell’s 
understanding of the disabled body affording a privileged status as it relates to informing and 
educating can be seen in Gregory’s depictions of virtuous models.  
 The understanding that a disabled body exists as a model of virtue within the theology of 
Gregory is most evidently portrayed in his depictions of Macrina.232 Gregory considered Macrina 
to have achieved the highest peak of human virtue. Yet, a significant portion of the writings that 
focus on her virtue take place near the end of her life where she is depicted as frail and weak. 
Gregory uses her frailty as a rhetorical device to signify wisdom, a sort of agony that exists as 
the framework for a pure perception that can only come from struggle. As her suffering reaches 
its climax and she is near death, she continues to use her body to positively influence the other 
bodies around her as she reflects on the body of the Bridegroom. Gregory writes of Macrina,  
The day was almost over and the sun was beginning to set, but the zeal in her did not 
decline. Indeed, as she neared her end and saw the beauty of the Bridegroom more 
clearly, she rushed with greater impulse toward the One she desired, no longer speaking 
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to those of us who were present, but to that very One whom she looked with steadfast 
eyes.233 
 
In suffering and illness, as she did in life, Macrina manifests the reflection of divine perfection in 
her bodily life. Macrina’s life shows the self-emptying nature that exists in Gregory’s depiction 
of virtuous models, a self-emptying that exists as a greater reality to those with physical or 
mental disabilities. Even amidst the illness that took her life, Macrina exists as a virtuous model, 
further suggesting that the ability to be a virtuous model exists without the necessity to any 
mental or physical precedent of skill or ability. Instead, the ability to exhibit virtue and aid others 
in their epektasis is rooted in the Holy Spirit. Gregory writes, “In all of this, she went on as if 
inspired by the power of the Holy Spirit, explaining it all clearly and logically. Her speech 
flowed with complete ease, just as a stream of water goes down a hill without obstruction.”234 
Despite physical limitations and severe ailment, Macrina remained able to eloquently 
communicate her virtue through the power of the Holy Spirit. This further suggests that even 
disabilities that work to severely limit communication can be overcome in order to convey the 
inner life of the virtuous model.  
 The virtuous model ultimately exists as a performative body that guides other observing 
bodies in both conscious and unconscious ways. Through this description a clear account can be 
made for the virtuous model taking on a pedagogical role. Any relationship where one person is 
providing counsel or instruction to another carries with it obvious power dynamics, where the 
one instructing can be seen categorically more important than the one learning. However, the 
final sections of the Life of Macrina show a woman who Gregory refers to as having reached the 
highest level of moral and virtuous life, teaching from her example of a virtuous life. To borrow 
                                                 
233 Macr, GNO VIII. i., Callahan, 179-180. 
234 Macr, GNO VIII. i., Callahan, 176.  
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from Fiona Kumari Campbell, the ability for Macrina and virtuous models similar to her to strive 
so far in their epektasis is due, in part, to the self-emptying necessity to their lives in bodies with 
disability. That is, the same imparting of bodily gesture, mental presence, differential reference 
points, and passionate emphasis that exists for teachers with disabilities in a modern classroom 
setting becomes a part of basic human interactions that guide and influence epektasis. In his most 
famous example of virtuous models, Gregory depicts Macrina being limited by an exceedingly 
worsening illness, which in turn allows the reader to see the ways disabled bodies have the 
aptitude to depict reflections of divine virtue, ultimately bringing us closer to God through 
epektasis.   
Conclusion  
 The work of disability theorists work to create a more robust depiction of disability as a 
means of educating and ultimately creating a more integrated society. Although disability theory 
was not a part of the considerations Gregory of Nyssa wrote with, his theology of the body 
remains inclusive to these individuals. This can first be seen, with the help of Tobin Siebers, by 
considering Gregory’s understanding of beauty. Siebers shows the ways in which standards of 
beauty must be defined without the inclusion of perfection. By not removing perfection, society 
works to disqualify individuals whose bodily life consists of perceived imperfections. Gregory, 
too, emphasizes an all-encompassing inclusiveness for beauty. For Gregory, the human being is, 
at all times, wounded. These wounds are significant for the way they link individuals with the 
rest of humanity, as well as their shared nature with Christ, who was wounded. These wounds, 
that are both mental and physical, allow human beings to see beauty more clearly. Through the 
blending of Siebers and Gregory, fragility becomes indicative of human beauty. This is not to 
say that perfection is not featured as a standard of beauty within the theology of Gregory. 
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However, it is only applicable to God, who exists as a perfect model of divine beauty, 
hierarchically above a flawed and fragile humanity. Gregory works to show that although there is 
still beauty within the fragility of humanity, it exists as an insipid reflection of God’s perfect 
beauty.  
 Following the approach of the social model of disability, Fiona Kumari Campbell 
reminds her audience that her disability exists as a public issue. This means the inclusion of 
individuals with disabilities does not rely on mere equality, but extends to adopting a willingness 
to learn from these individuals. Campbell asserts that disability affords an individual a privileged 
status as it relates to the instruction of non-disabled persons. With disability comes a self-
emptying nature as a result of existing in a world where the individual person is predominantly 
“other.” This self-emptying, which shares traits with the theological understanding of kenosis, 
allows for a person to engage in pedagogical tasks free of typical apprehensions and reservations 
that would typically restrict a non-disabled person. The portrayal of a flawed body instructing 
virtuous lessons to a non-disabled audience is seen within the writing of Gregory in his depiction 
of his sister Macrina. Gregory depicts Macrina existing as an impeccable model of virtue, even 
though her body and mind are beginning to fail her. The account of his sister as she dies shows a 
true example of the self-emptying nature that is present in disability.  
 The hierarchical divide that is present within Gregory’s theological anthropology, with a 
perfect God on top of a flawed humanity, works to unify humanity. It is a divide that places all 
human beings on the same sort of equal plane of fragility.  Accepting humanity as entirely 
separate from perfection forces reconsideration for the ways in which society engages with 
individuals with disabilities. This recognition creates space to say that humanity exists as flawed 
individuals, no different than the other individuals with whom they share life. This is seen in the 
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study of aesthetics, where the realization that different objects evoke responses of revulsion or 
attraction shows the ways human fragility is indicative of beauty. Showing that everything and 
everyone can be seen as flawed and blemished depending on the assessor calls for new 
considerations to be made about who is most qualified to fill the role of virtuous archetypes. 
Individuals with disabilities therefore hold a preferential option to become virtuous instructors 
and models for society due to the perceived fragility in their lives. Individuals with disabilities 
have the capacity to operate as an ideal example of virtuous living despite a fragile bodily 
existence, to a society of flawed and fragile human beings. Gregory’s theology of epektasis and 
its call for individuals to learn from the models of virtue in their lives translates to a call for non-
disabled people to look to develop relationships with and look for spiritual guidance from 

















A Modern Example of Epektasis   
 
Conversations surrounding vocational positions attached to the field of social services are 
often reduced to cliché deductions. These occupations generally involve frequent 
communication, if not close interpersonal relationships, with populations that are considered 
“difficult,” “challenging,” “problematic,” or “demanding.” These occupations, in turn, are 
spoken to be “rewarding,” “gratifying,” and “fulfilling.” Although both sides of assumptions 
have varying levels of truth to them, anyone who serves in a field that falls under the umbrella of 
social services would be quick to suggest that the personal growth that takes place as a result of 
their profession is difficult to comprehend or eloquently explain. This sentiment is indicative of 
my experience working with individuals with developmental disabilities. As with any 
relationship, the communication that takes place between me and the individuals I work with is 
formative. I mature and grow from each interaction and apply the experience and knowledge 
gained in both intentional and unintentional ways. I have worked in the field of developmental 
disabilities for nearly five years. I have alternated between the roles of Direct Support 
Professional, who works as an aid in the homes and living areas of individuals, and Case 
Manager, who authors and implements plans to support individuals in their daily lives. In my 
short career, I have worked with a variety of individuals with a plethora of different abilities and 
medical diagnoses. Just as in my relationships with classmates and new acquaintances, my 
personality connects in more natural ways with certain individuals I work with than others. 
However, the depth of the connection shares no link with the communicative ability or 
behavioral disposition of the individual. Instead, my experience in the field has revealed a type 
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of comradery that is able to exist between two human beings who share very little in terms of 
commonality, or even communication. It is with this, that I turn to the story of Brooke.235 
Brooke 
Brooke is a 50 year old woman with developmental disabilities. Throughout the majority 
of her life she has had qualifiers attached to her identity such as “high-functioning” and 
“independent.” Brooke has lived in a variety of different housing contexts: at home with her 
parents, in an apartment with a boyfriend, an intentional community, and most recently, a group 
home with two other female roommates. She used to be able to move independently in the 
community, using public transportation to navigate throughout the city. This allowed her to do 
errands like visit the bank and pull her own money out of an ATM machine and make trips to the 
grocery store and buy specific food items that she wanted. She was described as immeasurably 
gregarious and social, particularly loving conversations with new people.  
Two years before I met Brooke, staff began noticing changes in her behavior that were 
well beyond what they had become accustomed to expecting from her. Brooke began exhibiting 
aggression that manifested itself through intense screaming, physical and environmental 
violence, and making false accusations against staff. The dynamics of her group home quickly 
shifted, as it was not prepared to handle Brooke’s increasingly unsafe behavior. Her support team 
quickly made the decision to move her to a facility that was better equipped to keep her safe until 
an official diagnoses could be made and a plan could be implemented.  
                                                 
235 In this context, “Brooke” exists as a pseudonym. All personal details of the individual presented in the thesis 
have been omitted, edited, or fabricated as a way of preventing any personal information from being gleaned from 
the text. My experiences with Brooke did not take place as a part of any sort of study attached to my MTS degree. 
Instead, I am drawing upon my work experience retrospectively and anecdotally as a way of building practical 
context and support for the main idea of the thesis.  
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 Brooke’s existence at the behavioral facility was far more austere than she had become 
accustomed to experiencing in the various living situations she had throughout her life. Designed 
specifically for the management of large scale behaviors, she stayed the entirety of her days in an 
isolated room which included padding to keep her safe. In the times when her self-injurious 
behavior became exceptionally severe, the facility’s staff implemented different restraints that 
worked to prevent her limbs from inflicting harm on herself. The staff from Brooke’s group 
home continued to visit her daily, attempting to help the team at the behavioral facility best serve 
Brooke. With each visit, they noticed a continued decline in her personality and reasoning 
ability. The behaviors increased in both quantity and duration, and her favorite people, who had 
long been able to calm her down through presence and conversation, began to lose their ability to 
speak to her sensibilities. Through all this, Brooke was subjected to an assortment of medical 
examinations that attempted to pinpoint the specific cause of her severe behavioral change.  
 The process of diagnoses for individuals with developmental disabilities can be daunting, 
particularly when communication is hindered by ability or behavioral challenges. Often times 
these individuals do not have the capacity to articulate the specifics of what they are 
experiencing. They are unable to give precise guidance to their bodily involvement by saying, for 
example, that they are having sharp pains in their stomach or ringing in their ears. Often an 
ailment is communicated by behaviorally lashing out at those who are closest to them. Bodily 
actions such as screaming or pinching are often meant to be communicative. The commonly held 
understanding of behavioral intervention compounded the difficulty in Brooke’s case. With each 
continued day of aggression, those around her contended that the behaviors had to be the 
consequence of some negative health experience. If followed, this logic assumes that the 
diagnoses and treatment of the infirmity will ultimately lead to a decrease in behavior.  
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 Eventually, a diagnosis came: Frontotemporal deterioration, or FTD. FTD is 
characterized by progressive neuronal loss that takes place in the frontal and/or temporal lobes. 
Individuals with FTD frequently experience extreme shifts in their behavior, including issues 
with anger, perception, memory, expressive and receptive language, etc. The frontal lobe is the 
location in which the brain modifies constraints on basic reflexive behaviors.236 It has a crucial 
role in higher mental functions such as motivation, planning, social behavior, and speech 
production.237 Thus, deterioration in behavior and personality in a previously behaviorally stable 
person is indicative of FTD. In one case study, the conclusion that was reached read as follows: 
“Treatment of such patients is ambiguous and failures can be expected.”238   
 The diagnosis of FTD essentially meant that there was little that the medical community 
could do to alleviate Brooke’s behaviors. It was therefore necessary to shift the conversation 
from the ways in which the behaviors could be alleviated to a more nuanced approach to keeping 
Brooke safe. Crucial to this discussion was where she would live. Although the facility where 
she had been staying was best equipped to prevent the physical and environmental damage 
caused by her actions, it was still an institution, lacking any semblance of a home. Her support 
staff decided that they would attempt to bring her back to the group home where she had spent 
her previous fifteen years. Although this move risked severely changing the dynamics of the 
group home, her staff felt like it was the best decision to allow her to return to her home. This 
involved moving her bedroom to an area of the house away from her roommates and spending a 
large sum of money on revamping the areas she would live in to better keep her safe. The house 
                                                 
236 Elvir Becirovic, S. Kunic, Rusmir Softic, and Zikrija Dostovic, “I Will Kill You Tomorrow: Orbital Frontal Lobe 
Personality Case,” in European Psychiatry vol. 30, Supplement 1, abstracts of the 23rd European Congress of 
Psychiatry, 1529.  
237 Ibid.  
238 Ibid.  
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also doubled the amount of staff that was in the house at one time in order to accommodate a 
resident who was considered to be in a “crisis situation.” 
 However, Brooke’s crisis existed without a resolution; it was her new reality and the 
reality of the staff. The specifics of Brooke’s behaviors are difficult to describe because they 
changed frequently. Some days she would simply move about her living area and scream, yelling 
at the staff about the different things she did not like about them. Other days she would refuse to 
wear clothes, urinating and defecating on the floor. When staff came near her to offer food or 
clean up a mess, she would often attack them. These attacks featured a mixture of hitting with 
fists, kicking, and biting. Additional money in the group home’s budget was allocated for 
protective equipment like gloves and arm sleeves that could not be bitten through. When she first 
arrived home she still had, what staff referred to as, “good days.” On a good day, she would 
move about the rest of the house, sitting with others in the kitchen or family room. She would 
talk about her life and the people she knew. She would tell funny stories and say things to make 
people laugh. Occasionally, she would become agitated during these times when staff did not 
expect it. When this happened, staff had to move quickly in order to keep her roommates safe, 
since her previous good mood had allowed her to be in much closer proximity to them. When in 
a good mood, Brooke made no reference to moments when she was agitated. It was as if she 
shared no commonality with the woman who earlier in the day had been screaming at the staff. 
The staff that was fortunate enough to be working on a good day would garner a bit of celebrity 
from the other staff who wanted to hear the stories of their interactions with a happy Brooke.  
 As time progressed good days began to happen less frequently. She also began 
experiencing negative health ramifications due to her behaviors. The constant straining of her 
muscles in anger caused damage to her internal organs that required surgery to repair. Because 
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medication options were limited, surgery for Brooke required a well-planned process spanning 
over the course of several days. Staff and hospital security generally worked together to keep her 
as safe as possible during her hospital stay. At times, restraints needed to be used. There always 
exists the possibility that the type of internal injury that was sustained will reoccur due to the 
sustained behavior and physical straining.  
 Brooke’s relationship with staff is fairy universal. At times, she will choose one specific 
staff member that is on a shift and treat them as an ally. This means Brooke will seek solace in 
this one person and will tell them the different ways she perceives the other staff have mistreated 
her. These relationships are very short-term, as she quickly turns on the staff she has favored. 
Although these times are short-lived, it remains difficult not to be totally invested in these brief 
moments of comfort. Despite her diagnoses of FTD, Brooke has a phenomenal memory as it 
relates to the staff. She uses this knowledge as a way of making her verbal assails more 
personalized. She will frequently reference family members of staff, particularly their children, 
the types of cars they drive, or physical characteristics of their appearance. For example, the two 
most frequent insults she directs towards me involve my status as a student, or the fact that I 
often ride a bike to work. These translate to directions, “Go back to school!” and also more 
malicious requests, “I hope you die on your bike.”  
 My relationship with Brooke is vastly different than any other relationship I have ever 
had in both my professional and personal lives. We have shared virtually no moments that would 
be interpreted as blissful or happy. Each time we interact with one another it is filled with a sort 
of vitriol that is difficult to describe. Simply put, she has almost no happy moments in her day to 
day existence, and the lens in which she views me is filled constantly with a strange mix of 
anger, hatred, and what could best be described as fear. There is nothing I can do with my tone, 
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body language, speech, etc., that can keep this from happening. For example, she has frequently 
told me that I am yelling at her. I first feared that she must have overheard me in other rooms, 
speaking enthusiastically to her roommates. So, for several weeks I was conscious to never be 
heard speaking in the house unless I was talking directly to her. In talking directly to her, I used a 
tone that would classify as a whisper. Yet she still attested that I was yelling. Similarly, she made 
accusations that I had been pinching her. I thought deeply for days, thinking of all of the 
different ways my physical interactions with her (helping her change clothes, cleaning her soiled 
briefs, etc.) could be interpreted as a feeling similar to a pinch, and could think of nothing. The 
best conclusion I could reach is that in her mindset, everything I do to her is violent. The concept 
of “best intentions” is unable to be present in this relationship. I have tried everything I could 
possibly think of in order to garner a lasting positive relationship with Brooke, as have the other 
staff, and nothing has come close to working.  
 The field of developmental disabilities is robust. The specifics of each diagnosis differs 
vastly. Because of this, the experience from one support staff to another both share 
commonalities and fluctuate greatly depending on who it is they work with. For some, the 
medical fragility of their individuals makes it so that aspects of their health are of the most 
important concern. For others, it is their behavioral needs. Although I have worked with a large 
sample of people, I have always felt a stronger pull towards individuals who have high 
behaviors. Truthfully, part of the reason for this is that, usually, with large behaviors come large 
personalities. It has been my experience that a person, who is inclined to frequent outbursts, is 
also usually very funny and sociable when they are not upset. To put it simply, I have found my 
best relationships with individuals with developmental disabilities have come when a person 
with behaviors is in a good mood.  
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 This was the thought process I took into my first interactions with Brooke. I thought that 
our relationship would take time, similar to my working relationships in other group homes. 
However, within a few weeks I realized that this rapport would work differently than anything I 
had ever encountered before. The comprehension that no amount of trust could ever be 
developed, no matter the effort or time spent with her was difficult for me to grasp. However, 
what ultimately revealed itself was something much more unique than anything I had ever 
experienced in the field. Brooke’s aversion to any sort of human relationship has forced me to 
examine the ways in which I communicate with others. When the niceties in a relationship are 
completely one-sided, the temptation is to assume that the person who is putting forth the 
majority of the effort is left isolated in aspects of relational bonding. But this could not be further 
from the truth with Brooke. Despite her near constant behaviors and abhorrence to interactions 
with others, I frequently find myself learning new and beautiful things about the world and 
myself every day that I spend time with her.  
 The first learning experience that transpired involved the realization that communication 
functioned in a more broad sense than I had ever imagined. In the past, I have worked closely 
with individuals who have been deemed “non-verbal,” causing me to learn the vast ability human 
beings have to communicate and develop relationships without ever uttering a word, but Brooke 
is different. Brooke talks to me and has the ability to express what she wants. The challenge does 
not rest in sifting through an apophasis of speech, but rather involves a more detailed 
comprehension of the manner of her personality. Typical communicative cues are habitual. The 
words we speak are often repeated versions of a similar message we have already stated. 
Similarly, I have found in my experience when communicating with a non-verbal individual with 
developmental disabilities, there too exists a habitual nature in dialogue. I often find a phrase, 
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action, or voice that results in a signifier of happiness and frequently return to variations of what 
causes the portrayed happiness in my interpersonal interactions with the individual.  
 Put simply, interactions with Brooke work differently because there is nothing that works 
to cause this sense of happiness or affirmation. There is no possibility of meeting in the sort of 
middle ground of contentment that exists in the majority of other interactions. Brooke speaks, but 
it is virtually always in an aggressive tone. In a lot of ways she is immensely more challenging to 
communicate with than any person I have ever known that is described as “non-verbal.” Even 
when given specific food or personal items she has requested, Brooke oftentimes screams at the 
person following her instructions. Although each of us face unfortunate interactions that involve 
a person’s discontent, the sustained aggression makes these interactions unique to my 
relationship with Brooke.  
 A major part of our correspondence, therefore, takes place through bodily cues. If she 
lingers around close to me, I know to offer up food or drink. If she hits herself in the head, I can 
tell that she wants to be left alone. If she attacks the bathroom door, it could mean that she wants 
to attempt to use the bathroom or have her brief changed. It is in thinking about this bodily 
communication that I have been most reminded about the ways in which human interaction 
becomes about showing and preserving dignity. I have spent many hours thinking as I work with 
Brooke about what dignity looks like in this context. Does a person who lives her life in a 
constant state of anger have dignity? How do my actions and interactions help to maintain or 
harm her dignity? At the surface level, the answer would have to be no. Brooke is almost always 
in tattered clothes due to ripping them daily. Her hair is disheveled and sometimes matted due to 
her refusal to bathe. Because it is rare that she finishes a meal without throwing her dish and 
utensils, she is often sticky from the day’s food and drink. This is not to mention the way her 
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aggression causes her to interact with her bodily waste. But this understanding of dignity is, in a 
sense, a social construct, one that is perpetuated by society’s interpretation of how human life is 
supposed to exist without the limitations of fragility.  
 One of the more significant barriers on establishing a sense of dignity within an 
interpersonal communication is the prevailing cultural perspective on autonomy. An ideal, which 
G.J. Agich refers to as the “mainstream” model of autonomy, features attributes and values of 
self-reliance, personal preference, and a self-assertion that implies a strong level of 
independence.239 The level of disability that Brooke experiences falls far outside this 
understanding of dignity. This impacts the way individuals come to think of her relationship with 
staff. For example, when her siblings visit, they often bring the staff special treats, or gifts, an 
action that no other family members of any other resident in the home does. This only started 
after Brooke’s autonomy decreased to the point where her family recognized her as a “burden” 
on those who are paid to work with her. Often times, when staff from other houses hear of the 
behavioral situation at our home, they express abhorrence that the organization would force us to 
work in these types of conditions. They ask if the staff at Brooke’s home are better compensated 
due to the circumstances. This suggests that my role as a caregiver is only necessary up to a 
certain point of responsibility, a line that Brooke has crossed by losing an invented standard of 
dignity and autonomy.  
 The way in which society works causes individuals to understand a person’s worth 
through what they are able to do, rather than celebrating them as being. A person’s worth is often 
judged according to his or her capacity to produce, or be useful. S. Kay Toombs highlights this 
societal understanding by writing, “when we say to our children, ‘you can be anything you want 
                                                 
239 G.J. Agich, “Chronic Illness and Freedom,” in Chronic Illness: From Experience to Policy, ed. S.K. Toombs, D. 
Barnard, and R.A. Carson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 133-136.  
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to be,’ what we mean is that you can achieve worth by doing.”240 Like many other individuals 
with disabilities, Brooke’s dignity and worth cannot be gleaned from her completion of tasks. 
Brooke’s worth also cannot be summarized by her ability to be kind or have positive interactions, 
because those do not exist. Because of her disability, and the ways in which her brain 
continuously causes her to exist in an agitated state, she comes nowhere near typical societal 
markers of “success.” 
 My relationship with Brooke has shown me the ways in which a group home creates 
space to exist outside of this sort of societal structure that creates limits on dependence. The staff 
at Brooke’s home work to do every single task necessary for her to live. Staff provide meals and 
snacks, even to the point of feeding Brooke if her behavior escalated to a point where she cannot 
safely feed herself. Staff do laundry, and aid in taking her medicine. There is no task that is 
required of Brooke. Yet, this does not limit her worth as a person in any way. Instead, Brooke’s 
personhood begins and ends in her existence. She has worth because she is. There are steps staff 
must take to insure that her personhood is authenticated. Staff always attempt to give her space 
to express herself or give an opinion, even if this almost never results in a constructive 
conversation. Because Brooke’s disposition often prompts negative responses, it is often easier to 
talk to another person about her, keeping Brooke in the dark about things that are impacting her 
life. Although it is often more difficult, staff must always attempt to speak directly to Brooke 
about actions that they are taking, such as cleaning her room. These examples can be seen as 
common sense when thinking about typical interactions, but these are often difficult to 
                                                 
240 S. Kay Toombs, “Living and Dying with Dignity: Reflections on Lived Experience” in Disability: The Social, 
Political, and Ethical Debate, eds. Robert M. Baired, Stuart E. Rosenbaum, and S. Kay Toombs, (Amherst, New 
York: Prometheus Books, 2009), 341.  
93 
 
implement to a person as aggressive as Brooke. Yet, they remain vastly important for the ways 
























Chapter 5  
Conclusion 
 The setting of the group home, with the emphasis on being rather than doing, becomes a 
perfect backdrop for a modern application of epektasis. Brooke and I exist in a relationship that 
is mutually benefitting, in a way that disregards the capital of doing for one of being.241 Brooke 
benefits by me being in her life for the ways in which I support her. This transaction does feature 
doing, through the physical tasks I do to help her and the physical ways I keep her safe. 
However, I also am important to Brooke from the perspective of being. I am a constant source of 
companionship to Brooke, and I give her a person to communicate with. I act as an advocate for 
her when family or medical personnel come into the home. Although she frequently exerts 
aggression towards me, due to her inability to leave the house or maintain relationships I have 
become one of the closest people to her. Similarly, despite the constant hostility, my time spent 
with Brooke has caused me to grow quite fond of her. I think of her frequently on my days off, 
and I often ask about her when I receive calls from work about other things. I have learned a 
great deal about the ways in which relationships function despite a lack of affirmation, as well as 
the way love can grow for a person who is unable to express it back. This positive impact that 
Brooke has had on me stretches far outside of a cliché feeling that people often use to express 
when they interact with someone who is “less fortunate” than themselves. The type of feeling 
that suggests a relationship with a person “makes me appreciate what I have.” Although 
Brooke’s life does make me feel this way, my admiration for her is far deeper than this. It is one 
that causes me to see all other aspects of my life in a different light.  
 The reason for this, I think, is best articulated with the help of Gregory of Nyssa. The 
Christian life is called to a radically different understanding of dependence. That is, rather than 
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pursuing the standard goal of autonomy that society often demands, Christians are instead called 
to lives that are relational.242 This sort of interpersonal connection is often seen through 
relationality and service, both prominent themes of Gregory’s theology. Through the lens of the 
Christian faith, the types of relationality and service exhibited to Brooke takes on a connotation 
of developing the highest moral qualities of character. Service is not a matter of being taken 
advantage of, but rather being given the opportunity to imitate a Christ-like sacrifice. Similarly, 
Brooke’s lifestyle takes on a different light. Within Christianity, the physical and mental anguish 
that Brooke is experiencing is not considered contradictory to the human experience. Instead, 
pain and suffering are considered a part of human life, as exhibited by the life of Christ. Both 
relationality and creating space for suffering in the human experience exist as crucial factors 
within Gregory’s notion of epektasis. These virtues that are shared between Brooke and I are 
exercised through our relationship, and relate to a way of being in the world that is not dependent 
on mental attributes or abilities. By lacking even the common ground of affirming speech, 
Brooke and I are able to exist outside of society’s standard criteria of successful relationships 
and instead exist in a world of spiritual growth through shared virtue. Society would turn its head 
away from the type of suffering present in Brooke’s disability. Epektasis maintains that this type 
of affliction is a part of spiritual growth.  
Nyssen Fragility within Virtue and Beauty  
 It is with this in mind that I return to thinking about my relationship with Brooke and the 
ways in which she exists as an example of beauty and a model of virtue. Brooke’s body is 
fragile. Her behaviors and aggression make it so that she often misses meals and rarely sleeps. 
Because of this, she is significantly underweight and constantly looks exhausted. The reality of 
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human finitude is constant when I am in her presence. Yet, this is a finitude that pushes beyond a 
fear of death. Brooke’s life exists as a reminder that the fragility of humanity does not always 
mean the end of life, but rather points to the long-term suffering through it. It is within this 
constant reminding of human fragility where Brooke reveals the most about beauty and virtue.  
The most obvious question that is raised is how someone with whom I am unable to 
maintain an agreeable conversation shares attributes of beauty and virtue. The answer to this can 
be seen in Gregory’s divide between perfection as it is portrayed in God and strived for by 
humanity in epektasis. Perfection cannot be a human standard because human beings are not 
perfect. The same way that Tobin Siebers argues that perfection cannot provide the only standard 
for beauty, perfect relational communication cannot provide the only relational standards. 
Instead, perfection is a constant progress. In his treatise De Perfectione, written towards the end 
of his life, Gregory writes, “For this is truly perfection: never to stop growing towards what is 
better and never placing any limit on perfection.”243 Because perfection exists, not as an ideal, 
but as progress in epektasis, communication with Brooke is not limited, allowing for her virtue to 
be shared. It is through Brooke’s fragility, and the fragility of God’s perfection, that virtue can be 
shared.  
 The beauty seen in Brooke, like the beauty described in Gregory, is not exclusively 
noetic. It extends beyond the intellect into the human body. Brooke’s body is both the same and 
different than my own. It has the same general shape, and the same internal structure supporting 
its life. Yet her disability, and the self-injurious behavior she inflicts on herself, have made her 
look unwell. Observing a body in this way affords the opportunity to think critically about bodily 
understandings that are often taken for granted. It acts as a reminder that interactive bodily skills, 
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which most often seem habitual and unremarkable, are a gift. They are a beautiful aspect of 
creation that is instilled in the human body in order for relationships to form and the divide 
between humanity and God to be diminished. The instability of a disabled body acts as an 
extreme example of the instability of all bodies.244 It is not just that all bodies have the capacity 
to become disabled as a result of illness or accident, but that, for all, the pieces of a person’s 
genetic makeup are held together in contingent ways.245 
 The strand that holds together bodies with identified disabilities, and bodies who are held 
together in contingent ways, is participation. Within the canon of Gregory, participation was 
portrayed as happening in two ways, vertically, between humanity and God, and horizontally, 
among humanity. Horizontal participation, for Gregory, is the sharing of humanity in the one 
common human nature.246 It is important to note that this nature is unstable because the virtue 
and character of human beings are always changing. Similar to the body’s fragility, human 
nature is also fragile, albeit shared. This participation in shared nature creates space for a 
disabled person to fill a pedagogical role, and exist as a model of virtue, by making the growing 
task of epektasis a relational endeavor. Recognizing the shared human nature removes the 
potential of “othering” a disabled person, looking to learn from their medical diagnoses instead 
of their virtues. 
The body that puts an individual with disabilities at risk of being viewed as the other 
works to show the Nyssen divide between God and humanity. Society sees the bodies of 
individuals with disabilities as portraying imperfection in a way that is more obvious than the 
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bodies of a non-disabled person. Thinking about this in light of Gregory’s theology brings out an 
obvious tension. To Gregory, God exists as a form of perfection that is inaccessible and 
incomprehensible to human beings. Gregory also affirms that human beings exist as the imago 
Dei, a disposition that in some way allows for similarities between God and humanity. The 
existence of disability pushes individuals to ask what about God allows for humanity to exist as 
the imago Dei, while also being disabled. For Brooke, as for all of us, the absence of perfection 
in life is a crucial element of who she is. A sudden transition into perceived perfection, be it a 
complete medical cure or an absence of disability, remains unimaginable for it would make 
Brooke into a different person. The hope of transformation that exists for Brooke, as for all of us, 
should not be a hope of intellectual or physical advancement, but rather the type of spiritual 
advancement that is found in human relationships.247 
The notion of fragility exists as a key concept of standard theological accounts of 
disability. Often, the nature of God is described as being perfect, with varying levels of 
delicateness that allow for God to be open to the suffering and imperfections humanity 
experiences. This depicts God as meeting humanity in its struggle, and existing as a part of 
human suffering. However, when Gregory considers the nature of God, he explicitly states the 
opposite. God instead exists as hierarchically separate from humanity. Yet his depiction of the 
body, coupled with the benefits of virtuous models in epektasis, raises the question of what 
counts as perfection to Gregory of Nyssa? The answer to this is within his portrayal of Macrina. 
As previously shown, Gregory considers Macrina to be his quintessential model of a virtuous 
life. Gregory also describes Macrina as having fragility in poor health, teaching from the bed on 
which she would later die. Although Gregory asserts the hierarchical divide, he also accounts for 
                                                 
247 Frances Young, God’s Presence: A Contemporary Recapitulation of Early Christianity, (Cambridge, University 
Press, 2013), 107.  
99 
 
a fragile human being existing as a mirror of God. This thought shapes my relationship with 
Brooke, who simultaneously impacts my own epektasis by the way she enhances the reality of 
my human fragility.  
If Gregory asserts that anyone within a fragile humanity can mirror God in their existence 
as imago Dei, and their role as a model of virtue, does this mean that God has fragility? If so, 
does flawed humanity exist as a direct mirror of perfection, or is it that human fragility is, in fact, 
a part of perfection? These questions are difficult to answer without imposing a specific reading 
upon Gregory, but there remain small deductions that can be made, the most meaningful of 
which is Christological. In their depictions of Christ, the Church fathers, including Gregory, 
often portrayed Christ with the wounds on his hands, feet, and sides.248 Christ simultaneously 
exists as perfection and fragility, as evidenced by his death and resurrection. A person’s 
experience in life, undoubtedly flawed and wounded, shapes their being and in turn works to 
shape others through epektasis. Gregory’s depiction of the body’s role in epektasis works to 
show that human weakness is disclosive of God, and human relationship is the medium in which 
to address fragility. By accepting human fragility as a reality and not a thing in which to 
overcome individuals, in turn, become more fully themselves.  
The application of Gregory of Nyssa’s theology of epektasis to modern concerns of 
disabilities acts as a sort of theologia perennis, a parallel to the diversely used philosophia 
perennis.249 In this vein, Gregory’s application exists outside of the typical dissection of 
historical theology and transcends the limitations imposed on it by time. The perennial nature of 
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Gregory’s theology holds a deeper focus in light of relationality with an individual with 
disabilities. My relationship with Brooke opens up Gregory’s canon to a new strand of 
accessibility and potential for application. In this sense, a relationship with an individual with 
disabilities affords me a privileged access to the deepest truths of Christianity.250 It is possible to 
understand the theology of epektasis and how relationships with virtuous models aids in 
perpetual progress towards God without such a relationship. However, living in constant 
relationship with the self-emptying nature indicative of disabilities allows for the beauty of this 
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